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Belief disagreements have been suggested as a major contributing factor to the recent
subprime mortgage crisis. This paper theoretically evaluates this hypothesis. I assume that
optimists have limited wealth and take on leverage in order to take positions in line with their
beliefs. To have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on asset prices, they need to borrow from traders with
pessimistic beliefs using loans collateralized by the asset itself. Since pessimists do not value
the collateral as much as optimists do, they are reluctant to lend, which provides an endogenous
constraint on optimists￿ability to borrow and to in￿ uence asset prices. I demonstrate that
the tightness of this constraint depends on the nature of belief disagreements. Optimism
concerning the probability of downside states has no or little e⁄ect on asset prices because these
types of optimism are disciplined by this constraint. Instead, optimism concerning the relative
probability of upside states could have signi￿cant e⁄ects on asset prices. This asymmetric
disciplining e⁄ect is robust to allowing for short selling because pessimists that borrow the asset
face a similar endogenous constraint. These results emphasize that what investors disagree
about matters for asset prices, to a greater extent than the level of disagreements. When
richer contracts are available, relatively complex contracts that resemble some of the recent
￿nancial innovations in the mortgage market endogenously emerge to facilitate betting.
JEL Codes: G1, G12, E3, D53
Keywords: Belief disagreements, heterogoeneous priors, collateral constraints, leverage,
margin, asymmetric disciplining, short selling.
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The recent subprime mortgage crisis highlighted the importance of investors￿belief disagreements
for asset prices. A number of commentators, e.g., Shiller (2005) and Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2008),
have identi￿ed the optimism of a fraction of investors as a potential cause for the increase in
asset prices in the run-up to the crisis in the markets for housing and mortgage backed securities.
The optimistic buyers in these markets have often ￿nanced their asset purchases by borrowing
from other, potentially less optimistic, investors. Much of this borrowing, e.g., mortgages, margin
loans, or REPO loans, has been collateralized by the asset itself. In these transactions, the fraction
of the asset price buyers pay is referred to as the margin. Geanakoplos (2010) reports that the
average margin used to purchase $2.5 trillion worth of so-called toxic mortgage backed securities
was about 6% in 2006, while it dramatically increased to over 80% in 2009. Why was it easy for
optimists to borrow before the crisis? Why was it di¢ cult during the crisis?
To address these questions, this paper presents a model of credit markets with belief disagree-
ments. Two types of traders with heterogeneous prior beliefs (optimists and pessimists) invest in
a risky asset or (riskless) cash. Traders can also borrow cash or the asset from each other. The
model features a standard collateral constraint: All borrowing contracts must be secured by col-
lateral (cash or the asset) which the borrower owns. If the borrower￿ s promised payment exceeds
the value of collateral, then she defaults on the contract and the lender receives the collateral.
Di⁄erent borrowing contracts are available for trade at competitive prices. The contracts that are
actually traded, along with the price of the asset, are determined in general equilibrium.
The model reveals an endogenous borrowing constraint which has the potential to shed some
light on borrowing contracts observed before and during the crisis. The constraint stems from
borrowers￿and lenders￿belief disagreements. To ￿x ideas, consider optimists that purchase the
asset by borrowing cash from pessimists. Pessimists might be reluctant to lend because they
do not value optimists￿collateral (the asset) as much as optimists do. This represents an en-
dogenous constraint on optimists￿ability to borrow and to in￿ uence asset prices. A symmetric
argument shows that belief disagreements also constrain pessimists￿ability to borrow the asset
from optimists. In this paper, I systematically analyze the implications of this constraint. In
my baseline setting, borrowing the asset (short selling) is not allowed and borrowing cash is re-
stricted to simple debt contracts that promise a ￿xed payment independent of the future state.
These assumptions are useful to isolate optimists￿borrowing constraints. I gradually relax the
assumptions ￿rst by allowing for simple short contracts, which are useful to analyze pessimists￿
borrowing constraints; and then by considering richer contracts, which are useful to analyze the
e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on borrowing constraints.
My main result, formalized in Theorems 2-4, concerns the baseline setting and shows that
optimists face di⁄erent endogenous constraints depending on the type of their optimism. To
clarify, consider a simple example in which a single risky asset is traded. There are three states,
good, normal and bad, in which the asset￿ s future price will respectively be high, average and low.
1Pessimists assign an equal probability, 1=3, to each state. In contrast, optimists have a greater
expected valuation of the asset. In this example, one can imagine two di⁄erent types of optimism.
For the ￿rst case, suppose optimists assign a probability less than 1=3 to the bad state, and equal
probabilities to the normal and the good states. That is, optimism is on the downside in the sense
that optimists think bad states are unlikely. Downside optimism might have applied during the
recent ￿nancial crisis (in the Fall of 2008 and early 2009), when a main dimension of uncertainty
was about the length and the scope of the economic recession.1 In this case, I show that optimists
borrow by using loans with relatively high margins and the current price is relatively low (in
particular, relatively close to pessimists￿valuation). For the second case, suppose optimists agree
with pessimists about the probability of the bad state, but they assign a greater probability to the
good state than the normal state. That is, optimism is on the upside in the sense that optimists
think good events are likely. Upside optimism might have applied in the run-up to the crisis,
when a fraction of homebuyers thought house prices would continue to increase at a high rate (see
Case and Shiller, 2003). One can construct this case such that optimists￿valuation of the asset is
the same as in the ￿rst case, so that optimism di⁄ers in type but not level. In this case, I show
that optimists borrow by using loans with lower margins and the price is higher (in particular,
closer to optimists￿valuation).
One way to summarize this result is to note that optimism is asymmetrically disciplined by
the endogenous borrowing constraint: Downside optimism is disciplined while upside optimism is
not. The intuition for asymmetric disciplining is related to the asymmetry in the shape of the
payo⁄s of collateralized loans. Optimists pay the loan in full in upside states, but they default in
downside states. Consequently, optimism about the probability of downside states translates into a
disagreement about how to value the loans, which tightens the endogenous borrowing constraint.
This induces optimists to borrow using loans with higher margins on which there is relatively
less disagreement. This in turn decreases optimists￿demand for the asset and leads to a lower
equilibrium price. In contrast, optimism about the relatively likelihood of upside states does not
tighten the endogenous borrowing constraint. Optimists borrow with loans with lower margins
and the asset price is higher.
The asymmetric disciplining result lends itself to a number of comparative statics results
regarding the e⁄ect of belief disagreements on asset prices. Miller (1977) has shown that, with
short selling constraints, an increase in belief disagreements tends to increase the overvaluation
of the asset (relative to the average valuation in the population) because the asset is held by the
most optimistic investors. In contrast, the level of belief disagreements in my baseline setting has
ambiguous e⁄ects. This is because, while an increase in buyers￿optimism tends to increase the
price, an increase in lenders￿pessimism tends to decrease the price through the tightening of the
endogenous borrowing constraint. Theorem 5 quali￿es the Miller mechanism for environments
in which optimists ￿nance their asset purchases by borrowing from less optimistic lenders. In
1The downside nature of the uncertainty during this period was also noted by Chairman Bernanke in his semi-
annual report to the Congress on February 24, 2009, when he said: ￿This outlook for economic activity is subject
to considerable uncertainty, and I believe that, overall, the downside risks probably outweigh those on the upside.￿
2particular, an increase in belief disagreements increases the asset price (and decreases margins)
if the additional disagreements concern non-default states, but it has the opposite e⁄ect if the
disagreements are about default states. Put di⁄erently, what investors disagree about matters for
asset prices, to a greater extent than the level of their disagreements.
A shortcoming of the Miller (1977) mechanism is its reliance on exogenous constraints on short
selling, which restricts its applicability. In contrast, my asymmetric disciplining result continues
to apply even if the asset can be short sold. I analyze short selling in an extension of the baseline
setting with simple short contracts. Pessimists use these contracts to borrow the asset from
optimists, which they then sell in the market. Pessimists use their cash holdings to collateralize
their promise to return the asset. The key insight is that short contracts, just like debt contracts,
default if the value of their promise (the asset) exceeds the value of the cash-collateral. This
makes optimists reluctant to lend the asset, providing an endogenous constraint on pessimists￿
ability to short sell. I show that pessimism is also asymmetrically disciplined by this constraint.
Moreover, since short contracts default in the symmetric-opposite states as debt contracts (high
asset payo⁄ vs. low asset payo⁄), the asymmetric disciplining of pessimism is complementary
to the asymmetric disciplining of optimism. When belief disagreements are on the upside, the
endogenous borrowing constraint is loose for optimists but tight for pessimists, which leads to
a price closer to optimists￿valuation. When the belief disagreements are on the downside, the
situation is the opposite and the price is closer to pessimists￿valuation. In particular, belief
disagreements systematically a⁄ect asset prices despite the fact that optimists and pessimists can
borrow with an ￿equally rich￿set of contracts (i.e., simple debt and short contracts).
While simple debt and short contracts are common in ￿nancial markets, rapid ￿nancial in-
novation in recent years has made available richer contracts such as options, futures, and more
complex derivatives. A natural question is how the availability of these contracts interact with
optimists￿or pessimists￿borrowing constraints. I address these issues in an extension with unre-
stricted contracts, and obtain two main results. First, the asymmetric disciplining result is robust
to the presence of richer contracts. Second, relatively complex contracts that resemble some of the
recent innovations endogenously emerge to facilitate betting. In particular, the asset is tranched
so that optimists receive the asset payo⁄only in su¢ ciently good states, while pessimists receive it
in bad states. The tranching of the asset resembles the collateralized debt or mortgage obligations
(CDOs, CMOs) by which the payo⁄ from the underlying asset is split across traders according to
their di⁄erent needs. Similarly, cash is also tranched so that pessimists receive a constant payo⁄
in su¢ ciently bad states, while optimists receive the payo⁄ in good states. The tranching of cash
resembles credit default swaps (CDSs) or synthetic CDOs by which pessimists receive an insur-
ance payment in bad states in exchange for paying insurance premiums in good states. Taken
together, this analysis suggests that belief disagreements (or a related source of heterogeneity in
valuations) might be a driving force behind some of the recent ￿nancial innovations.
Outline. The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. The next subsection discusses
the related literature. Section 2 describes the model and de￿nes the equilibrium corresponding
3to a general set of borrowing contracts. Section 3 considers the baseline setting with simple debt
contracts and characterizes the equilibrium. This section also presents the main result about the
asymmetric disciplining of optimism. Section 4 analyzes the comparative statics of equilibrium
with respect to the type and the level of belief disagreements. Sections 5 and 6 respectively present
the extensions with simple short contracts and richer contracts. The paper ends with concluding
remarks and several appendices that present omitted proofs and extensions.
1.1 Related Literature
My paper is closely related to the work of Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010), who pioneered the
general equilibrium analysis of collateralized lending and asset prices, and provided a plausible
model of countercyclical loan margins. The distinctive feature of my analysis is the focus on the
role of di⁄erent types of belief disagreements.2 To capture this feature, I consider an extension
of the Geanakoplos￿ (2003) model with a continuum of states (as opposed to two or three),
which allows for a ￿ exible speci￿cation of traders￿beliefs. To keep the analysis tractable, I also
consider only two belief types of traders, optimists and pessimists (as opposed to a continuum).
My analysis o⁄ers a number of new insights. First, while Geanakoplos (2003) shows that an
increase in belief disagreements can increase margins and decrease asset prices considerably, my
paper quali￿es this result and emphasizes the type of belief disagreements rather than the level.
In the Geanakoplos￿model, the increase in belief disagreements increases margins because the
disagreements are concentrated on downside states. An increase in belief disagreements in that
model would actually decrease margins (and increase asset prices) if the additional disagreements
were about upside states. Second, I generalize the Geanakoplos￿model by allowing for short selling
which is not uncommon in ￿nancial markets. Third, I also generalize the model by allowing for
unrestricted contracts. Geanakoplos (2010) shows that the introduction of the CDS contract
reduces the asset price. My analysis complements this result by showing that relatively complex
contracts some of which resemble the CDS endogenously emerge when the contract space is
su¢ ciently rich. In recent work, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) analyze further the asset pricing
implications for these contracts in the two state model.
Another distinctive feature of my model is that the loans traded in equilibrium are risky.
Thus, my model is particularly suitable to study economic issues associated with default of col-
lateralized loans, which were at the forefront during the recent subprime crisis. In contrast, the
baseline setting in Geanakoplos (2003, 2010) features no default because loans are endogenously
collateralized according to the worst case scenario. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2011) show that this
is always the case when there are two continuation states and traders hold assets only because of
the cash ￿ ows they generate. Put di⁄erently, to have default in equilibrium, one must consider
either more than two continuation states as in this paper, or traders that receive non-pecuniary
2In recent work, Park and Sabourian (2010) show that the type of traders￿ beliefs also matters in a di⁄er-
ent context, learning in ￿nancial markets, to determine whether informational herding (following the crowd) or
contrarianism (acting against the crowd) is observed.
4utility from owning the collateral (as could be the case for housing or cars). In related work,
He and Xiong (2011) show that frequent trading further mitigates default and bankruptcy risk,
because traders in equilibrium endogenously choose to borrow with shorter term debt.
My paper is part of a large theoretical literature that concerns the e⁄ect of borrowing con-
straints on asset prices, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Gromb
and Vayanos (2002), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011).3
In addition, my results on loan margins are related to the corporate ￿nance literature that con-
cerns the determinants of leverage, e.g., Townsend (1979), Myers and Majluf (1984), Gale and
Hellwig (1985), Hart and Moore (1994). The main di⁄erence from these literatures is the fo-
cus on belief disagreements as a friction that constrains borrowing, as opposed to asymmetric
information, lack of commitment, or exogenously speci￿ed borrowing (or margin) constraints.
My results on short selling contribute to a literature that analyzes the frictions that constrain
asset lending. Du¢ e (1996), D￿ Avolio (2001) and Lamont (2004) emphasize that the participation
constraints of potential asset lenders (for legal, institutional, or behavioral reasons) are crucial
to sustain positive short fees. Du¢ e, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002) analyze the role of search
frictions in generating large short fees. My paper analyzes the role of collateral constraints in
restricting asset lending, and shows that the short fees (and short margins) are also a⁄ected by
the nature of traders￿belief disagreements.
The relationship of my paper to the literature initiated by Miller (1977) has been discussed.
In related work, Harrison and Kreps (1978) consider a dynamic asset pricing setting with belief
disagreements in which the identity of optimists changes over time. When short selling is con-
strained, the asset price exceeds the present discounted valuation of any trader because of the
resale option value to future optimists. As Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) note, this resale option
value may be reasonably called a ￿speculative bubble.￿My results suggest that, when optimists
are borrowing constrained, speculative bubbles ￿nanced by credit are more likely when belief
disagreements concern upside states (see Simsek, 2010, for a formalization).4
3On the empirical side, recent work in asset pricing, e.g., Jurek and Sta⁄ord (2011), can explain the pricing of
collateralized loans with di⁄erent margins during the recent crisis, but cannot speak to the endogenous determination
of margins. A growing literature documents balance sheet leverage and REPO margins during the crisis, e.g., Adrian
and Shin (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2011), Copeland et al. (2010), Krishnamurthy et al. (2011).
4There is a large literature that analyzes the asset pricing implications of heterogeneous beliefs and short selling
constraints. In addition to the mentioned papers, an incomplete list includes Jones and Lamont (2001), Chen, Hong
and Stein (2002), Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003), Lamont and Stein (2004).
Papers that analyze speculative bubbles include Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011).
A related literature concerns the plausibility of heterogeneous prior beliefs in ￿nancial markets. Morris (1995)
provides an excellent discussion of the merits of the common prior assumption, and argues that heterogeneous priors
should be selectively incorporated into economic analysis. Another concern is whether belief disagreements would
disappear in view of traders￿Bayesian learning. Recent theoretical work (e.g., Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz,
2009) has emphasized that Bayesian learning might fail to generate agreement even in the long run. A related
concern is Friedman￿ s (1953) market selection hypothesis, which posits that investors with incorrect beliefs should
be driven out of the market as they would consistently lose money. Recent research (e.g., Sandroni, 2000, Blume
and Easley, 2006, and Cao, 2011) has demonstrated the limitations of this hypothesis, by showing that traders with
inaccurate (and heterogeneous) beliefs may have a permanent presence when ￿nancial markets are incomplete.
52 Basic Environment with Borrowing Constraints
Consider an economy with two dates, denoted by f0;1g, and a single consumption good which
will be referred to as a dollar. The economy has a continuum of risk neutral traders who have
endowments at date 0, but who only consume at date 1. Traders can transfer their endowments
to date 1 by investing in one of two ways. First, traders can keep their dollars in cash which yields
one dollar at date 1 for each dollar invested at date 0. Cash is supplied elastically and its role is
to ￿x the riskless interest rate for this economy, which is normalized to zero. Second, traders can
also invest in a risky asset which is supplied inelastically at date 0 at a normalized supply of one
unit. The asset yields dollars only at date 1, and it is traded at date 0 at a price p which will be
endogenously determined.




pays s dollars if state s is realized, so the state captures the uncertainty in the asset￿ s payo⁄.
Traders have heterogeneous priors about the state. In particular, there are two types of traders,
optimists and pessimists, respectively denoted by subscript i = 1 and i = 0. Type i traders￿
prior beliefs about the state is given by the probability distribution Fi over S. Traders know each
others￿priors, that is, optimists and pessimists agree to disagree.5 The probability distributions
F1 and F0 have density functions f1;f0 which are continuous and positive over S. Let Ei [￿] denote
the expectation operator corresponding to the belief of a type i trader. Optimists are optimistic
about the asset in the sense that:
E1 [s] > E0 [s]: (1)
In subsequent sections, this assumption will be strengthened by various regularity conditions.
Without loss of generality, I normalize the mass of each type of traders to 1. Type i traders
are initially endowed with ni > 0 dollars and zero units of the asset. All units of the asset are
initially endowed to unmodeled agents who sell their asset holdings at date 0 and consume.6 An
economy is denoted by the tuple E =(S;fFig;fnig).
In view of assumption (1), optimists are the natural buyers of the asset. In addition to
investing their endowments, optimists might want to borrow cash from pessimists to increase their
investments in the asset. Relatedly, pessimists might want to borrow the asset from optimists to
short sell. The common feature in these arrangements is borrowing (either cash or the asset). I
next describe the frictions that constrain borrowing in this economy.
5This assumption provides a simple model of trade based on belief disagreements. To the extent that prices
do not fully reveal information, e.g., because of liquidity or noise traders, the present model could be viewed as
a reduced form for a setting in which belief disagreements are driven by di⁄erences in information rather than
priors. That said, models with information di⁄erences have some additional features, e.g., the possibility of market
breakdowns, which are not captured by the present model.
6The only role of this assumption is to simplify the analysis by eliminating the feedback e⁄ect from asset prices
to traders￿net worths. See Simsek (2010) for an earlier version of the paper in which all assets are initially allocated
to the traders in the economy. The results continue to apply as long as optimists initially do not hold the entire
asset supply.
62.1 Borrowing Constraints in General Equilibrium
All borrowing in this economy is subject to a collateral constraint. That is, promises made
by borrowers must be collateralized by either the asset or the cash that they own. I model
this constraint using a general equilibrium approach similar to Geanakoplos (2003, 2010). In this
approach, borrowing contracts are not determined by a negotiation process between borrowers and
lenders. Instead, contracts are treated as commodities that are traded in anonymous competitive
markets. Traders choose their positions in all available contracts taking the prices of contracts as
given. The contracts that are traded in non-zero quantities are determined in equilibrium.7




, is a promise of ’(s) ￿ 0 dollars in
state s, collateralized by ￿ ￿ 0 units of the asset and the ￿ ￿ 0 units of cash. The contract is
traded in an anonymous market at a competitive price q (￿) that will be endogenously determined.
A trader who sells contract ￿, the borrower, borrows q (￿) dollars at date 0. The borrower sets
aside ￿units of the asset and ￿ units of cash that she owns as collateral. A trader who buys
this contract, the lender, lends q (￿) dollars at date 0. The lender becomes entitled to a payment
of ’(s) dollars in state s of date 1. However, the lender may not receive ’(s) dollars in full
because the payment is only enforced by collateral. More speci￿cally, if the future asset value s
is such that ’(s) > ￿s + ￿, then the contract defaults and the lender only receives the value of
the collateral, ￿s + ￿. Combining the default and the non-default events, the payo⁄ of contract
￿ can be written as:
min(￿s + ￿;’(s)). (2)
This framework can account for various di⁄erent forms of collateralized borrowing arrange-
ments, as illustrated by the following examples.
1. Simple debt contracts. Consider a contract that satis￿es ’(s) ￿ ’ for some ’ 2 R+. This
corresponds to a debt contract in which the borrower promises a ￿xed payment of ’ dollars at
date 1. The debt contract is simple in the sense that the borrower￿ s payment does not depend on
the future state. Simple debt contracts provide a model of some common collateralized loans (e.g.,
REPOs, mortgages, asset purchases on margin) which do not have many contingencies. Sections
3.3 and 4 (the baseline setting) analyze the equilibrium corresponding to this set of contracts.
2. Simple short contracts. Consider a contract that satis￿es ’(s) ￿ ’s for some ’ 2 R+.
This corresponds to a short contract in which the borrower promises to return ’ units of the asset
at date 1. The short contract is simple in the sense that the promised number of assets does not
depend on the future state. Simple short contracts provide a model of short selling the asset.
Section 5 analyzes the equilibrium corresponding to this set of contracts.
7The general approach of treating contracts as commodities has been pioneered by Prescott and Townsend
(1984a, 1984b). The equilibrium notion in this section has been ￿rst developed by Geanakoplos and Zame (1997,
2009).




’ :S !R+ is measurable and bounded,
￿ 2 R+, and ￿ 2 R+.
)
I equip B with the sup norm, which makes it into a Banach space. The rest of this section
de￿nes the general equilibrium corresponding to an exogenously speci￿ed subspace, BT ￿ B. The




denote the space of ￿nite Borel measures over BT, endowed with the weak* topol-
ogy. I model traders￿contract choices as elements in P
￿
BT￿
. To keep the notation simple, I
assume that all traders of the same type make identical choices (This assumption is innocuous as
explained in Footnote 9). In particular, type i traders choose two measures, ￿+
i ;￿￿
i . The measure,
￿+
i , represents traders￿positive positions on contracts: that is, it captures the contracts through
which type i traders lend. The measure, ￿￿
i , represents traders￿negative positions in contracts:
that is, it captures the contracts through which type i traders borrow. In addition, I assume that
the price function, q : BT ! R+ is restricted to be Borel measurable and bounded, which also
makes it integrable with respect to ￿+
i and ￿￿
i . Then, type i traders￿budget constraint can be
written as:








i ￿ ni. (3)
Here, ai 2 R+ denotes the traders￿asset demand, ci 2 R+ denotes their cash holdings, and the
integral terms respectively capture their lending and borrowing. Note that the negative positions,
￿￿










In particular, traders must own su¢ ciently many assets and cash to pledge as collateral for the
contracts they sell. Note that there is no analogous condition for traders￿positive positions, ￿+
i ,
because lending does not require collateral.






aiEi [s] + ci + Ei
￿R





BT min(’(s);￿s + ￿)d￿￿
i
￿ , (5)
subject to (3) and (4).
8Note that traders calculate their expected payo⁄s (and payments) on assets and contract portfolios
according to their own beliefs. The market for contracts is competitive. In particular, the price
function q (￿) is determined by debt market clearing. Since there is a mass 1 of each type of






De￿nition 1. A general equilibrium is a collection of prices
￿




^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+
i ; ^ ￿￿
i
￿
i2f0;1g such that the portfolios solve Problem (5) for each i 2 f0;1g, the asset market
clears,
P
i2f0;1g ^ ai = 1, and debt markets clear [cf. Eq. (6)].
3 Equilibrium with Simple Debt Contracts
This section characterizes the general equilibrium in the baseline setting with simple debt con-
tracts. It also presents the main result which shows that optimism is asymmetrically disciplined
by borrowing constraints.
Recall that a simple debt contract is denoted by
￿
[’(s) = ’]s2S ;￿;￿
￿
for some ’ 2 R+. In
addition, I assume the cash-collateral is zero, ￿ = 0, which is without loss of generality in this
section.8 I also normalize the contracts by taking the asset-collateral to be one, i.e., ￿ = 1. Under
these assumptions (and normalization), the set of traded contracts is given by:
BD ￿
￿￿
[’(s) ￿ ’]s2S ;1;0
￿
j ’ 2 R+
￿
. (7)
When there is no confusion, I denote a simple debt contract in BD by its promised payment, ’.
Restricting attention to the contract set BD represents two frictions in addition to the collateral
constraint. The ￿rst friction is the absence of short selling. The second friction is the absence of
more general debt contracts which may promise payments contingent on the asset￿ s value s. It
is natural to start with simple debt contracts, and defer the analysis of richer contracts to later
sections, for a number of reasons. First, many assets other than stocks are di¢ cult and costly to
short sell, and many common collateralized loan arrangements (e.g., REPOs or asset purchases
on margin) do not feature contingencies. Second, considering simple debt contracts conforms
well with a strand of the ￿nancial frictions literature that focuses on simple and riskless debt
contracts (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, or more recently, Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2011).
The analysis in this section is more general than this strand of the literature because optimists
are allowed to borrow with contracts that might default in some future states.
To characterize the equilibrium, I ￿rst consider an alternative principal-agent model of bor-
rowing constraints which is more tractable than the general equilibrium model. I proceed by
establishing the equivalence of the equilibria of the two models. I then characterize the principal-
8To see this, consider a contract (’;￿;￿) with ￿ > 0. The transfers generated by this contract can be equivalently
captured by the contract, (max(0;’ ￿ ￿);￿;0).
9agent equilibrium. The equivalence result not only provides a method of solving the general
equilibrium, but it also clari￿es (in the context of economy E) the relationship between the gen-
eral equilibrium and the principal-agent models of borrowing constraints.
3.1 An Alternative Principal-Agent Model of Borrowing Constraints
As an alternative to the general equilibrium model, one could imagine that contracts are deter-
mined as the result of a contractual negotiation process between borrowers and lenders. In this
case, it would be possible to characterize the set of constrained e¢ cient contracts. However, the
contract allocation within this set would depend on the allocation of bargaining power between
traders (as well as the details of the bargaining process). To make progress, it is common in the
literature to focus on the special case in which borrowers have all the bargaining power (cf., Gale
and Hellwig, 1985 and Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). This leads to a principal-agent approach:
The borrower chooses the debt contract subject to a set of frictions and lenders￿participation
constraint.
I next consider this approach for the economy E. Suppose optimists (who are the natural
borrowers with simple debt contracts) choose their borrowing and outstanding debt subject to a
participation constraint for pessimists (who are the natural lenders). To eliminate corner cases, I
also make the following assumption:
Assumption (A1). n1 < E1 [s] ￿ smin and n0 > E1 [s] ￿ n1.
The ￿rst part of the assumption ensures that optimists (in equilibrium) cannot fund their asset
purchases with riskless debt. The second part ensures that pessimists￿endowment is su¢ ciently
large to meet optimists￿borrowing demand. Given assumption (A1), I will establish that the
equilibrium price satis￿es p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]). Since the price is greater than the pessimistic
valuation, pessimists have no interest in investing in the asset. They use their endowment to
invest in cash and to lend to optimists. In contrast, optimists make leveraged investments in the
asset. The remaining question is how much optimists borrow and how many assets they demand.
To address this question, let a1 denote optimists￿asset position and ’ denote their outstanding
debt per-asset at date 1. In view of the collateral constraint, optimists￿actual payment on their
debt is given by min(s;’). Consequently, lenders￿participation constraint implies that their
lending per-asset at date 0 is given by E0 [min(s;’)]. Optimists choose their asset position and




a1E1 [s] ￿ a1E1 [min(s;’)], (8)
s.t. a1p = n1 + a1E0 [min(s;’)].
The ￿rst line is optimists￿expected payo⁄at date 1: They receive a payo⁄from the asset but they
make a payment on their debt. The second line is optimists￿budget constraint which incorporates
lenders￿participation constraint.
10De￿nition 2. Given assumption (A1), a principal-agent equilibrium is a pair of asset price p
and optimists￿portfolio (a￿
1;’￿), such that optimists￿portfolio solves problem (8) and the asset
market clears, that is, a￿
1 = 1.
The principal-agent equilibrium will be characterized in Section 3.3. The characterization
(and the equivalence result in Section 3.2) requires the following regularity condition on beliefs,
which ensures that problem (8) has a unique solution for each p.
Assumption (A2). The probability distributions F1 and F0 satisfy the hazard-rate order:
f1 (s)
1 ￿ F1 (s)
<
f0 (s)
1 ￿ F0 (s)




The hazard-rate order is equivalent to saying that
1￿F1(s)
1￿F0(s) is strictly increasing over S. Intu-
itively, this notion of optimism concerns optimists￿relative probability assessment for the upper-
threshold events [s;smax] ￿ S. It posits that optimists are increasingly optimistic for these events
as the threshold level s is increased. It captures the idea that, the ￿better￿the event becomes,
the greater the optimism is for the event. The hazard-rate order is related to some well known
regularity conditions. It is stronger than the ￿rst order stochastic order, that is, the inequality in
(9) implies that F1 dominates F0 in the ￿rst order stochastic sense. However, it is weaker than
the monotone likelihood ratio property: that is, if
f1(s)
f0(s) is strictly increasing over S, then the
inequality in (9) holds.
3.2 Equivalence of the Principal-Agent and the General Equilibrium
The principal-agent approach is useful for its simplicity and tractability. However, the assumption
that optimists have the bargaining power requires motivation. In contrast, the general equilibrium
approach does not a priori take a stance on traders￿bargaining powers. It is perhaps fortunate
that for this economy the two approaches are equivalent, as shown by the following result.
Theorem 1 (Existence, Uniqueness, and Equivalence of Equilibria). Suppose the contract
space is restricted to simple debt contracts, BT = BD, and assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold.
(i) There exists a unique principal-agent equilibrium [p￿;(a￿
1;’￿)] with p￿ 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]).




^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+





. In this equilibrium,
optimists borrow and pessimists lend, i.e., ^ ￿+
1 = ^ ￿￿
0 = 0. Moreover, only a single contract is traded
in non-zero quantities, that is, ^ ￿￿
1 (and thus, ^ ￿+
0 ) is a Dirac measure that puts weight only at one
contract ^ ’ 2 BD. The general equilibrium is essentially unique in the sense that the portfolios,
the asset price, ^ p, and the price of the traded debt contract, q (^ ’), are uniquely determined.
(iii) The general equilibrium and the principal-agent equilibrium are equivalent:
^ p = p￿, ^ a1 = a￿
1 = 1, ^ ’ = ’￿, and q (^ ’) = E0 [min(s;’￿)]. (10)
The ￿rst part establishes the existence and the uniqueness of the principal-agent equilibrium.
The second part establishes the existence and the essential uniqueness of the general equilibrium.
11The only source of non-uniqueness is the price of non-traded debt contracts, q (’) for ’ 6= ^ ’.
However, this non-uniqueness is inessential in the sense that it does not a⁄ect the equilibrium
portfolios or prices of traded contracts.9 The third part of the theorem establishes that the general
equilibrium is identical to the principal-agent equilibrium. More speci￿cally, in either equilibrium
optimists have the same outstanding debt per-asset, ^ ’ = ’￿, and they borrow the same amount,
q (^ ’) = E0 [min(s;’￿)], which also leads to the same asset price, ^ p = p￿.
Put di⁄erently, the general equilibrium approach results in contracts as if optimists have all
the bargaining power. There is a simple explanation for this result. Since traders￿endowments
are assumed to be su¢ ciently large, n0 + n1 > E1 [s], some traders must hold cash in general
equilibrium. Since cash yields a gross return of 1 and it is not used as collateral, those traders
must receive a gross return of 1 on their net worth. Since the price is interior, p￿ 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]),
optimists can always secure a gross return higher than 1 by simply holding the asset. In contrast,
pessimists cannot receive a higher return in the asset market since short selling is not allowed.
Thus, the traders that hold cash in equilibrium must be the pessimists. It follows that pessimists￿
participation constraint binds and optimists receive all of the surplus from trade.
Intuitively, when the exogenously speci￿ed contract set includes only simple debt contracts,
the competitive equilibrium favors optimists. With simple debt contracts, the asset is useful as
collateral while cash is not. Thus, pessimists, who are the natural holders of cash, compete to make
loans to optimists, rather than the opposite. In line with this intuition, Section 5 characterizes
the polar opposite case with only simple short contracts and shows that the general equilibrium
results in allocations as if pessimists have all the bargaining power.
3.3 Optimists￿Optimal Contract
I next turn to the characterization of the principal-agent equilibrium. The next result, which is
the main result, characterizes optimists￿contract choice for a given price p. The next subsection
combines this analysis with asset market clearing to solve for the equilibrium asset price.
Recall that optimists￿outstanding debt per-asset is denoted by ’. Thus, optimists default
on their debt if and only if the future asset value, s, is lower than the threshold state, ￿ s ￿ ’.
Consequently, I will refer to this simple debt contract as a loan with riskiness ￿ s. Recall also that
optimists￿borrowing per-asset is given by E0 [min(s; ￿ s)], which I refer to as the size of the loan.
The size of the loan is increasing in its riskiness: that is, larger loans are also riskier loans. Given
these de￿nitions, one interpretation of problem (8) is that optimists choose from a menu of loans
with di⁄erent sizes (and thus, riskiness levels) which are priced by pessimists. The next result
9To keep the notation simple, I have formulated the model so that all traders of a given type (i.e., all optimists
and all pessimists) choose identical portfolios. Thus, Theorem 1 establishes the essential uniqueness of the general
equilibrium within this symmetric class. However, the equilibrium is in fact essentially unique also within the larger
class of allocations in which traders of a given type are allowed to behave di⁄erently. All optimists endogenously
choose the same portfolio because, in equilibrium, there is a unique solution to their optimization problem (8) (see
the proof in Appendix A.2). Pessimists do not necessarily choose the same portfolios since they are indi⁄erent
between lending to optimists and investing in cash. However, this is an inessential form of uniqueness which does
not a⁄ect traders￿returns or the asset price in equilibrium.
12characterizes the optimal loan.
Theorem 2 (Asymmetric Disciplining of Optimism). Suppose assumptions (A1) and (A2)
hold, ￿x asset price p that satis￿es p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]), and consider optimists￿problem (8). The
riskiness, ￿ s, of the optimal loan is the unique solution to the following equation over S:
p = popt (￿ s) ￿
Z ￿ s
smin





1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
. (11)
I will shortly provide a sketch proof of this result along with an intuition. Before doing so, it is
useful to note a few important aspects of the function, popt (￿). First, this function is similar to an
inverse demand function: Given the price on the y-axis, it describes the riskiness of the optimal
loan on the x-axis. Second, assumption (A1) implies popt (￿) is strictly decreasing and continuous
(cf. Appendix A.1). Since popt ￿
smin￿
= E1 [s] and popt (smax) = E0 [s], this further implies that
there is a unique solution to Eq. (11).
Note also that popt (￿) describes the equilibrium asset price conditional on the equilibrium loan
riskiness ￿ s. In particular, rewriting Eq. (11) yields the following asset pricing formula:
popt (￿ s) = F0 (￿ s)E0 [s j s < ￿ s] + (1 ￿ F0 (￿ s))E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s]. (12)
This formula shows that optimism is asymmetrically disciplined in equilibrium. More speci￿cally,
the asset is priced with a mixture of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs. Pessimistic beliefs are used
to assess the probability of default, F0 (￿ s), as well as the value of the asset conditional on default,
E0 [s j s < ￿ s], while the optimistic beliefs are used to assess the value of the asset conditional
on no default, E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s]. Consequently, optimism about the probability of default states will
not a⁄ect the asset price, while optimism about the relative probability of non-default states will
increase the price. The following example further illustrates this asymmetric disciplining property.
Example 1 (Asymmetric Disciplining of Optimism). Consider the state space
S =[1=2;3=2]. Consider the following two cases that di⁄er in the type of optimism.
Case (i). First suppose pessimists and optimists have the prior belief distributions F0 and
F1;D with density functions:




0:4 if s 2 SB ￿ [2=3 ￿ 1=6;2=3 + 1=6)
1:3 if s 2 SN ￿ [1 ￿ 1=6;1 + 1=6)
1:3 if s 2 SG ￿ [4=3 ￿ 1=6;4=3 + 1=6]
.
Here, SB, SN, and SG capture ￿bad￿ , ￿normal￿ and ￿good￿ events. Pessimists ￿nd all states
equally likely while optimists have downside optimism in the sense that they think a bad event is
unlikely.10
10Note that the belief distributions have discontinuous densities and they satisfy the hazard rate inequality,
(9), only weakly. These distributions are used for illustration purposes because they provide a clear intuition.
For analytical tractability, the formal results assume that beliefs have continuious densities and they satisfy the















































Figure 1: The top two panels display the probability density functions for traders￿beliefs in the
two scenarios of Example 1. The bottom panel displays the corresponding optimality curves,
popt (￿ s), the inverse of which gives the optimal loan riskiness ￿ s for a given price level p.
Case (ii). Next suppose pessimists have the same belief, but optimists￿belief is changed to





1 if s 2 SB
0:1 if s 2 SN
1:9 if s 2 SG
.
That is, optimists have upside optimism in the sense that they think a good event is more likely
than a normal event (while they agree with pessimists about the probability of the bad event). Note
also that optimists are equally optimistic in both cases, that is, E1;U [s] = E1;D [s].
The bottom panel of Figure 1 displays the optimality curves, popt (￿), corresponding to the
two cases. For any price p, optimists choose a larger and riskier loan in the second case (with
upside optimism) than the ￿rst case (with downside optimism). Equivalently, for any level of
loan riskiness ￿ s, the asset price is higher in the second case than in the ￿rst case, illustrating the
asymmetric disciplining of optimism.
I next present a sketch proof of Theorem 2, which will be useful to provide the intuition. Opti-
mists￿problem (8), after substituting a1 from the budget constraint, can be written as maximizing
n1RL
1 (￿ s), where:
inequality in (9) strictly.
14RL
1 (￿ s) ￿
E1 [s] ￿ E1 [min(s; ￿ s)]
p ￿ E0 [min(s; ￿ s)]
: (13)
This expression is the return of optimists who buy one unit of the asset and who ￿nance part of
the purchase using a loan with riskiness ￿ s. The denominator is the downpayment optimists make:
they borrow E0 [min(s; ￿ s)] from pessimists and they pay the rest of the purchase. The numerator
is optimists￿expected payo⁄: they expect to receive E1 [s] from the asset and they also expect
to pay E1 [min(s; ￿ s)] on their loan. Appendix A.1 shows that RL
1 (￿ s) has a unique maximum
characterized by the ￿rst order condition. The ￿rst order condition is given by p = popt (￿ s), which
completes the sketch proof of Theorem 4.
For intuition, it is useful to break down RL
1 (￿ s) into two components. First consider the left







This expression is the expected return of optimists if they buy the asset without borrowing. Since
the theorem concerns prices that satisfy p < E1 [s], the unleveraged return satis￿es RU
1 > 1.
That is, optimists perceive that investing in the asset yields a higher return than investing in the
storage technology. This creates a force that pushes optimists towards taking larger and riskier
loans to invest more in the asset.
However, there is a second force that operates in the opposite direction. This force is related
to the right hand side terms in the numerator and the denominator of (13), which constitute
optimists￿perceived interest rate on the loan:
1 + r
per
1 (￿ s) ￿
E1 [min(s; ￿ s)]
E0 [min(s; ￿ s)]
. (14)
Optimists borrow E0 [min(s; ￿ s)] on the loan, but they expect to pay E1 [min(s; ￿ s)], which leads
to the perceived interest rate r
per
1 (￿ s). Assumption (A1) implies that r
per
1 (￿ s) is always weakly
greater than the riskless rate of 0, and that it is increasing in ￿ s [cf. Appendix A.1]. This in turn
creates a force that pushes optimists towards taking smaller and safer loans. The intuition for
the properties of r
per
1 (￿) relies on two observations. First, collateralized loans always trade at an
interest rate with a spread over the riskless rate because lenders require compensation for their
expected losses in case of default. Moreover, since the loan market is competitive, the spread on a
loan is just enough to compensate lenders according to their pessimistic belief. Second, optimists
believe that the loan will default less often than pessimists do. Hence optimists think they will
end up paying the full loan amount more often. Consequently, optimists perceive that they will
pay a greater interest rate than the riskless rate. Moreover, for greater levels of ￿ s, the scope of
disagreement for default is greater, which implies that r
per
1 (￿ s) is increasing in ￿ s.
It follows that, while a larger and riskier loan enables optimists to take larger positions on the
asset, it also comes at a greater perceived interest rate, r
per
1 (￿ s). Optimists￿optimal loan choice
15balances these two forces. This breakdown of forces also provides an intuition for the observation




p , is greater. This induces optimists to borrow more by taking a larger and
riskier loan, agreeing to pay a greater perceived interest rate at the margin.
To see the intuition for the asymmetric disciplining, ￿x a loan with riskiness ￿ s, and consider
how much the price should drop (from the optimistic valuation) to entice optimists to take this
particular loan. Consider this question in the context of Example 1 for a riskiness level ￿ s = 0:8 2
SB. In the ￿rst case of Example 1, optimists ￿nd the bad event SB unlikely. Hence, given a
loan with riskiness ￿ s 2 SB, there is disagreement about the probability of default, which implies
r
per
1 (￿ s) > 0. As this loan appears expensive to optimists, the asset price should drop considerably
to entice optimists to take this loan. Consider instead the second case of Example 1. In this case,
for a loan with riskiness ￿ s 2 SB, there is no disagreement about the probability of default, which
implies r
per
1 (￿ s) = 0. As the loan appears cheap to optimists, the asset price does not need to fall
to entice them to take the loan (see Figure 1).
In other words, the asymmetric disciplining result operates through optimists￿borrowing con-
straints. When the optimism is on the downside, optimists perceive tighter borrowing constraints
[captured by a higher r
per
1 (￿ s)], which lowers their demand and leads to an asset price closer to
pessimists￿valuation. In contrast, upside optimism generates looser borrowing constraints and
leads to an asset price closer to optimists￿valuation.
3.4 Asset Market Clearing
I next consider asset market clearing and solve for the equilibrium. The budget constraint of
problem (8) characterizes optimists￿asset demand as:
a1 =
n1
p ￿ E0 [min(s; ￿ s)]
. (15)
The denominator of this expression is the downpayment optimists make to buy one unit of asset,
using a loan with riskiness ￿ s to ￿nance the rest of the purchase. The numerator is their endowment,
all of which they spend to purchase assets. Market clearing requires equating optimists￿asset
demand in (15) with the asset supply of 1, which leads to:
p = pmc (￿ s) ￿ n1 + E0 [min(s; ￿ s)]. (16)
Note that the market clearing curve, pmc (￿ s), is increasing: When optimists take a larger and
riskier loan, their demand for the asset is greater, which leads to a higher market clearing price.
The equilibrium is then found as the unique intersection of the increasing market clearing curve,
pmc (￿ s), and the decreasing optimality curve, popt (￿ s). The following result summarizes the char-
acterization of equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Suppose the contract space is restricted to simple debt contracts, BT = BD, and
16assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. There is a unique principal agent equilibrium price and contract
pair, p￿ 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]) and ￿ s￿ 2 S, characterized as the solution to the following equations:
p = pmc (s) = popt (s),
where pmc (￿) and popt (￿) are respectively de￿ned in Eqs. (11) and (16).
4 The Type and the Level of Belief Disagreements
This section establishes the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to the type and the
level of belief disagreements. In addition to the equilibrium loan riskiness, ￿ s￿, and the asset price,
p, an important variable is the margin on the loan:
m ￿
p ￿ E0 [min(s; ￿ s￿)]
p
. (17)
That is, the margin is the fraction of the price optimists pay out of their own pocket, while
￿nancing the rest of the purchase by using the collateralized loan. The comparative statics of
the margin are important for a couple reasons. First, margins are readily observable for some
common collateralized lending arrangements (e.g., REPOs, mortgages, or margin purchases).
Second, recent studies, e.g., Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), develop general asset pricing models
by taking margins as exogenous. The endogenous determination of the margin in this model
might inform the choice of the exogenous margins when applying these theories.
To establish the comparative statics for the type of belief disagreements, it is necessary ￿rst to
de￿ne the di⁄erent types. The following de￿nition introduces a notion of skewness of optimism.
De￿nition 3 (Upside Skew of Optimism). The optimism of distribution ~ F1 is more skewed
to the upside than F1 if:
(a) The distributions yield the same valuation of the asset, that is, E
h
s ; ~ F1
i
= E [s; F1].





1￿ ~ F1(s) ￿
f1(s)
1￿F1(s) if s < sR,
~ f1(s)
1￿ ~ F1(s) ￿
f1(s)
1￿F1(s) if s > sR,
for some sR 2 S. (18)
The optimism of distribution ~ F1 is strictly more skewed to the upside than F1 if the inequalities
in (b) are strict.
To interpret this de￿nition, note that the distributions ~ F1 and F1 cannot be compared accord-
ing to the hazard rate order of assumption (A2). In addition, these distributions lead to the same
valuation of the asset, that is, they have the same ￿level￿of optimism. Note also that ~ F1 has a
lower hazard rate than F1 over the region
￿
sR;smax￿
. Thus, conditional on upside states, s ￿ sR,
~ F1 is weakly more optimistic than F1 in the sense of assumption (A2). In contrast, F1 has a lower































































Figure 2: The top two panels display the hazard rates for traders￿priors in the two cases analyzed
in Example 1. The bottom panel plots the corresponding equilibria.
hazard rate than ~ F1 over the downside region
￿
smin;sR￿
, and thus its optimism is concentrated
more on this region. Hence, the optimism of ~ F1 is skewed to the upside.
The probability distributions, F1;D and F1;U, for the two cases of Example 1 satisfy condition
(18). In particular, the optimism of F1;U is weakly more skewed to the upside, as illustrated in
Figure 2. The same ￿gure also plots the equilibrium for the two cases and illustrates that the
equilibrium price and loan riskiness corresponding to F1;U are higher. The next result shows that
this observation is generally true.
Theorem 4 (Type of Disagreements). Consider the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 3.
If optimism becomes more skewed (resp. strictly more skewed) to the upside, i.e., if F1 is changed
to ~ F1 that satis￿es condition (18) while still satisfying assumption (A2), then: the asset price p
and the loan riskiness ￿ s￿ weakly (resp. strictly) increase, and the margin m weakly (resp. strictly)
decreases.
This result formalizes the sense in which optimism is asymmetrically disciplined. I provide
a sketch proof which is completed in Appendix A.3. Eq. (12) shows that the optimistic belief
a⁄ects the optimality curve, popt (￿ s), through optimists￿conditional valuation, E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s]. The




is, an increase in the upside skewness of optimism increases the conditional valuation for each
￿ s, even though it does not increase the unconditional valuation. It follows that the optimality
































































































































Figure 3: The left panel plots the equilibrium for the ￿rst case of Example 2: the increase in
belief disagreements concerns states above ￿ s￿ and it increases the asset price. The left panel plots
the equilibrium for the second case of Example 2: the increase in belief disagreements concerns
states below ￿ s￿ and it decreases the asset price.
curve shifts up pointwise. Since the market clearing curve, pmc (￿), is unchanged [cf. Eq. (16)],
the comparative statics in the theorem statement follow. Intuitively, as optimism becomes more
concentrated on upside states, optimists￿borrowing constraints become looser and their demand
for the asset becomes greater. This leads to a low margin and a high equilibrium price.
Theorem 4 shows that the type of the belief disagreements has an unambiguous e⁄ect on
margins and asset prices. A natural question is whether the level of belief disagreements has
similar robust predictions. The answer is no, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 (Ambiguous E⁄ects of an Increase in Disagreements). Consider the following
two cases, each of which features an increase in the level of belief disagreements.
Case (i). Consider the ￿rst case of Example 1 with downside optimism. Suppose the beliefs





1 if s 2 SB
1 + 0:45 if s 2 SN
1 ￿ 0:45 if s 2 SG




0:4 if s 2 SB
1:3 ￿ 0:45 if s 2 SN
1:3 + 0:45 if s 2 SG
:
That is, pessimists￿probability for the normal event increases and their probability for the good
event decreases, while the opposite happens to optimists￿prior. As the right panel of Figure 3
shows, in this case, the increase in belief disagreements leads to an increase in the asset price.
Case (ii). Next consider the second case of Example 1 with upside optimism. Suppose the





1 + 2￿0 if s 2 SB
1 ￿ ￿0 if s 2 SN
1 ￿ ￿0 if s 2 SG




1(1 ￿ 2￿1) if s 2 SB
0:1(1 + ￿1) if s 2 SN
1:9(1 + ￿1) if s 2 SG
,
for some parameters ￿0 and ￿1. That is, pessimists￿probability for the bad event increases (and
their relative probability for good and the normal event remains constant), while optimists￿prob-
ability for the bad event decreases. In addition, choose parameters ￿0 and ￿1 such that both
pessimists￿and optimists￿valuation of the asset is the same as in the ￿rst case of this example.
As Figure 3 shows, in this case, the increase in belief disagreements decreases the asset price.
Miller (1977) had argued that, when short selling is constrained, an increase in belief dis-
agreements tends to increase the overvaluation of the asset (relative to the average valuation in
the population) because the asset is held by the most optimistic traders. Example 2 illustrates
that, in this model, the increase in belief disagreements [in the sense of assumption (A2)] has no
robust predictions for the asset price. This is because both optimists￿and pessimists￿beliefs a⁄ect
the price. While an increase in borrowers￿optimism tends to increase the price, a decrease in
lenders￿pessimism tends to decrease it by tightening the borrowing constraints. This observation
illustrates that the Miller mechanism might not apply in markets in which optimists ￿nance their
asset purchases by borrowing from less optimistic traders.
I next derive a quali￿ed version of the Miller mechanism for these markets. In particular,
the next result shows that an increase in belief disagreements has robust predictions if the type
of the additional increase is taken into account. In the ￿rst case of Example 2, the increase in
belief disagreements is concentrated on states below the default threshold ￿ s￿, which leads to a
decrease in the asset price. In the second case of the example, the increase in belief disagreements
is concentrated on states above the default threshold ￿ s￿, which leads to an increase in the asset
price increases (see also Figure 3). The next result establishes that these properties are general.
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that what investors disagree about matters for
asset prices, to a greater extent than the level of their disagreement.
Theorem 5 (Level of Disagreements). Consider the equilibrium characterized in Section 3.
Consider an increase in belief disagreements, that is, suppose F1;F0 are changed to ~ F1; ~ F0 that
satisfy:
~ f1 (s)
1 ￿ ~ F1 (s)
￿
f1 (s)
1 ￿ F1 (s)
and
~ f0 (s)
1 ￿ ~ F0 (s)
￿
f0 (s)
1 ￿ F0 (s)
for s 2 S: (19)
(i) Suppose the increase in belief disagreements is concentrated on states above ￿ s￿ in the sense
that the hazard rate inequalities (19) are satis￿ed with equality for s 2
￿
smin; ￿ s￿￿
. Then, the asset
price p and the loan riskiness ￿ s￿ weakly increase, and the margin m weakly decreases.
(ii) Suppose the increase in belief disagreements is concentrated on states below ￿ s￿ in the sense
that the hazard rates inequalities (19) are satis￿ed with equality for s 2 (￿ s￿;smax). Then, the asset
20price p weakly decreases and the margin m weakly increases.
5 Equilibrium with Short Selling
The results so far share with Miller (1977) the assumption that short selling is not allowed, which
restricts their applicability. This section shows that the main result, asymmetric disciplining, is
in fact robust to allowing for short selling. I model short selling with the simple short contracts
introduced in Section 3. I characterize the equilibrium with short contracts and establish a version
of the asymmetric disciplining result for this setting.
It is useful to start by reviewing the salient features of a typical short sale transaction in
￿nancial markets. In a typical short sale, a trader borrows the asset from a lender who owns the
asset. The borrower raises p dollars from the short sale, which she leaves as cash-collateral with
the lender. However, the lender requires additional protection, which induces the borrower to
place an additional mSp dollars as cash-collateral. The short margin, mS, is the analogue of the
loan margin in the baseline setting since the borrower needs mSp dollars to short sell the asset.
Next period, the lender rebates the borrower￿ s cash collateral at a rebate rate, rrebate, which is
lower than the benchmark interest rate, r = 0.11 The di⁄erence, ￿rrebate, which is the analogue
of the interest rate spreads in cash-loans, captures the fee received by the lender. In practice,
the fee emerges from a variety of factors. Among other things, it compensates the lender for
expected losses from a potential default on the short contract. The model below focuses purely
on this component of the fee, abstracting away from other factors. The lender￿ s total fee from the
asset-loan can be written as:
f = ￿rrebate ￿
1 + mS￿
p:
Given the rebate rate and the total fee it implies, the net cash-collateral backing the borrower￿ s










p ￿ f. (20)
The above short sale transaction can be captured in this model by the simple short contracts
introduced in Section 2:12
BS ￿
￿￿
[’(s) ￿ s]s2S ;0;￿
￿
j ￿ 2 R+
￿
. (21)
In particular, a simple short contract promises a replica of the asset collateralized by ￿ units of
11In this model, the rebate rate is always negative in view of the normalization, r = 0. In practice, the rebate
rate is typically positive but lower than the benchmark interest rate. The assets with low or negative rebate
rates, equivalently high lending fees, are said to be ￿special.￿See D￿ Avolio (2002) or Lamont (2004) for excellent
descriptions of the short market.
12Recall that a simple short contract is generally denoted by ￿ =
￿
[’(s) = ’s]s2S ; 
a; 
c￿
for some ’ 2 R+. The
set, B
S, features two restrictions which are without loss of generality. First, I assume  
a = 0 because the transfer
implied by the contract, (’s; 
a; 
c), can be equivalently captured by the contract, (max(’ ￿  
a)s;0; 
c). Second,
I normalize the contracts by taking the number of assets short sold to be 1.





p ￿ f and p ￿ q (￿) = f. (22)
In particular, the cash-collateral of the short contract corresponds to the net cash-collateral, (20),
posted in the short sale transaction. The di⁄erence between the price of the asset and the price of
its replica (i.e., the short contract) corresponds to the total fee received by the lender. Given mS
and f, the rebate rate, rrebate, is also uniquely determined. Consequently, both the short margin
and the total lending fee, as well as the rebate rate, will be endogenously determined in general
equilibrium.
I next characterize the equilibrium corresponding to the set BS. In particular, to isolate the
e⁄ects of short selling, I rule out the simple debt contracts analyzed in the baseline setting (see
appendix A.5 for a generalization of the results in this section to a setting with both simple debt
and short contracts). The analysis of equilibrium follows closely Section 3. In this case, the
equivalent principal-agent equilibrium is one in which pessimists (who are the borrowers with
asset-loans) choose the short contract subject to optimists￿participation constraint. Since debt
contracts are not available, optimists are indi⁄erent between making an unleveraged investment
in the asset and buying the short contracts sold by pessimists.
The key observation is that pessimists default on the short contract when the future asset
price, s, exceeds the value of the cash-collateral, ￿. Thus, the actual payo⁄ of the short contract







Note that the price is increasing in the cash-collateral. Equivalently, keeping p ￿xed, the lending
fee in (22) is decreasing in ￿. When the cash-collateral is high, the short contract defaults less
often and the lending fee, which compensates the lender for losses from default, is lower.13
Next suppose pessimists use all of their cash holdings as collateral in short contracts. Pes-




x0￿ ￿ x0E0 [min(￿;s)], (24)





The ￿rst line is pessimists￿expected return which consists of their return from cash holdings net
of their expected payments on short contracts. The second line is pessimists￿budget constraint
which incorporates optimists￿participation constraint. The budget constraint illustrates that
13For example, the cash-collateral ￿ = s
max leads to q (￿) = p and a lending fee f = 0, because this short contract
is completely safe. From Eq. (22), the margin on this contract is solved from m
shp = s
max￿p. Hence, this contract
corresponds to the safe short contract analyzed in Gromb and Vayanos (2002). The di⁄erence in this paper is that
riskier short contracts (with lower short margins) are also available for trade.
22choosing lower cash-collateral enables pessimists to sell a greater number of short contracts. On
the other hand, recall that higher cash-collateral leads to a lower lending fee. Thus, pessimists
face a trade-o⁄ between a greater short position and a lower lending fee.
The next result, which is the main result of this section, characterizes pessimists￿optimal
short contract. The result requires the following analogues of assumptions (A1) and (A2):






Assumption (A2S). The probability distributions F1 and F0 satisfy:14
f1 (s) R s
smin ~ sdF1
>
f0 (s) R s
smin ~ sdF0




Theorem 6 (Asymmetric Disciplining of Pessimism). Suppose the contract space is re-
stricted to simple short contracts, BT = BS, and assumptions (A1S) and (A2S) hold. Fix asset
price p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]), and consider pessimists￿ problem (8). The cash-collateral, ￿, of the








smin sdF1 R ￿
smin sdF0 + 1 ￿ F1 (￿)
. (25)
The pricing formula (25) shows that pessimism is asymmetrically disciplined in equilibrium.
In particular, the pessimistic belief enters the relation only through its e⁄ect on the following
expression (which increases the price):
R ￿
smin s dF0
F0(￿). This expression shows that pessimism about
the relative likelihood of downside states, s ￿ ￿, decreases the asset price. More importantly,
it also shows that any other type of pessimism does not decrease the asset price. For example,
pessimism about the relative likelihood of upside states, s ￿ ￿, does not a⁄ect the price. Similarly,
pessimism about the probability of the event fs ￿ ￿g (while keeping the relative likelihood of states
s ￿ ￿ ￿xed) does not decrease the price. Figure 4 illustrates this result by plotting the optimality
curve, popt;S (￿), for two examples that di⁄er only in the type of pessimism. It shows that the
asset price is greater when the pessimism on the upside than when it is on the downside.
The intuition for this result closely parallels the intuition for the asymmetric disciplining of
optimism (cf. Section 3.3). First consider why popt;S (￿) is decreasing, that is, why pessimists
choose lower cash-collateral when the price is higher. Given a higher p, pessimists have a greater
incentive to bet. Consequently, they choose lower ￿ because this enables them to increase their
short position [cf. problem (24)]. Next, to see the intuition for asymmetric disciplining, consider
the cash-collateral, ￿ = 1:1, for the two examples plotted in Figure 4. Consider how much the
price should increase (from the pessimistic valuation, E0 [s]) for pessimists to short sell with ￿.
The answer depends on the type of pessimism. When the pessimism is on the upside (for states
s ￿ ￿), then optimists charge a positive short fee because they think the short contract is likely to
14Assumptions (A2) and (A2
S) do not imply each other. However, Assumption (A2
S) [as well as assumption
(A2)] is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property (cf. Section 3.1).















































Figure 4: The top two panels display the pessimistic and the optimistic pdf￿ s for two examples.
The examples di⁄er only in the type of pessimism: The bold lines correspond to pessimism on
the downside while the dashed lines correspond to pessimism on the upside. The bottom panel
plots the corresponding equilibria (the intersection of the optimality and market clearing curves).
default. Moreover, this short fee appears too high to pessimists because they think the contract
is unlikely to default. Consequently, the price should increase considerably to entice pessimists to
short sell with ￿. In contrast, when the pessimism is concentrated on the downside, optimists and
pessimists disagree less about the short fee corresponding to cash-collateral ￿. Consequently, the
price does not need to increase as much to entice pessimists to short sell with ￿. Put di⁄erently,
in this case pessimists face looser constraints for short selling, which leads to a lower price.
The equilibrium price is characterized by asset market clearing. Optimists￿endowment is
spent to purchase the asset and the short contracts sold by pessimists. Thus, asset market











The left hand side of this expression corresponds to the demand for the asset. The right hand side
corresponds to the e⁄ective supply, which is greater than the physical supply (one unit) in view
of short selling. Note that a smaller short margin, mS, enables pessimists to short sell a greater
number of assets.15 After substituting for mS in terms of p and ￿, Eq. (26) implicitly de￿nes a
market clearing relation between the price and the cash collateral, pmc;S (￿). Moreover, Appendix
A.4 shows that pmc;S (￿) is increasing in ￿. Intuitively, a smaller cash-collateral leads to a smaller
15The last term in Eq. (26),
E1[min(￿;s)]
E1[s] , is a normalizing factor which emerges from the fact that the short
contract is only an imperfect replica of the asset.
24short margin, which in turn leads to a greater short position and a lower market clearing price.
The equilibrium price and cash-collateral pair, (p;￿), is determined as the unique intersection of
the optimality curve, popt;S (￿) and the market clearing curve, pmc;S (￿) (see Figure 4).
Note that the asymmetric disciplining of pessimism identi￿ed in this section is complementary
to the asymmetric disciplining of optimism. When belief disagreements are on the upside,
optimists are less constrained while pessimists are more constrained. In equilibrium, this leads
to lower loan margins and higher short margins, and an asset price closer to the optimistic
valuation. In contrast, when belief disagreements are on the downside, loan margins are
higher, short margins are lower, and the price is closer to the pessimistic valuation. These
results establish that the main asymmetric disciplining result is robust to allowing for short selling.
6 Equilibrium with Richer Contracts
While simple debt and short contracts are common in ￿nancial markets, rapid ￿nancial inno-
vation in recent years has made available richer contracts such as options, futures, and more
complex derivatives. A natural question is how the availability of these contracts a⁄ect optimists￿
or pessimists￿borrowing constraints. Conversely, one might also wonder whether the borrowing
constraints among traders with disagreements might be a driving force behind some of the recent
innovations. To address these questions, this section considers the equilibrium with the unre-
stricted contract space. The analysis is simpli￿ed by the fact that, when the contract space is
su¢ ciently rich, every Arrow-Debreu equilibrium corresponds to a general equilibrium. Charac-
terizing the unique Arrow-Debreu equilibrium reveals two main results. First, a version of the
asymmetric disciplining result also holds for this setting. Second, relatively complex contracts
that resemble some of the recent innovations endogenously emerge in equilibrium. The analysis
also shows that richer contracts on balance have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the asset price.
I ￿rst de￿ne the Arrow-Debreu (AD) equilibrium for this economy. Suppose for each state s
there is an AD security that pays 1 dollar is the state s realized and nothing otherwise. I model
the price of AD securities with a (Lebesgue) measurable and bounded function qAD : S ! R+.
Traders choose measurable functions zi : S ! R+, which correspond to their positions in these







(ais + ci + zi (s))dFi, (27)
s.t. aip + ci +
Z
S
zi (s)qAD (s)ds ￿ ni,
ais + ci + zi (s) ￿ 0 almost everywhere (a.e.) on S.
25De￿nition 4. An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a collection of prices
￿





i (￿))i2f0;1g such that the portfolios solve problem (27) for each i 2 f0;1g,
the asset market clears,
P
i2f0;1g a￿
i = 1, and debt markets clear,
P
i2f0;1g z￿
i (s) = 0 a.e. on S.
The key feature of the AD equilibrium is that all promises are enforced at the balance sheet
level (via an unspeci￿ed mechanism, e.g., the threat of punishment) subject to a nonnegative
consumption constraint for the borrower. In contrast, promises in the general equilibrium are
enforced by the collateral explicitly speci￿ed in each borrowing contract. Hence, loosely speaking,
the general equilibrium features tighter constraints on borrowing. Nonetheless, the next result
shows that, when the contract space is su¢ ciently rich, every AD equilibrium for this economy
corresponds to a general equilibrium.
Theorem 7 (Equivalence of the AD Equilibrium to a General Equilibrium). Suppose







, and the contract space BT is either un-
restricted, BT = B, or it contains the following two contracts, f(’i;￿i;￿i)gi2f0;1g, where:
’i (s) ￿ max(0;￿z￿
i (s)) for each s 2 S; ￿i ￿ a￿
i and ￿i ￿ c￿
i. (28)
Then, there exists a general equilibrium,
￿
(^ p;[^ q (￿)]);
￿
^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+
i ; ^ ￿￿
i
￿￿
, that is equivalent to the AD
equilibrium. In particular, prices are given by:
^ p = p￿ and ^ q ((’;￿;￿)) =
Z
S
min(￿s + ￿;’(s))qAD (s)ds, (29)
and portfolios are given by: (^ ai;^ ci) = (a￿
i;c￿
i) and each ^ ￿￿
i is a Dirac measure that puts weight
only at contract (’i;￿i;￿i) (and ^ ￿+
1 = ^ ￿￿
0 and ^ ￿+
0 = ^ ￿￿
1 ).
The constructed general equilibrium is equivalent to the AD equilibrium in the sense that the
promises are equivalent [cf. Eq. (28)] and debt contracts are priced according to their fundamental
values in the AD equilibrium [cf. Eq. (29)]. Intuitively, the general equilibrium features a more
constrained choice set for traders than the AD equilibrium. Thus, a portfolio that is optimal in
the latter equilibrium is also optimal in the former equilibrium (with corresponding prices) as
long as it is feasible. This feasibility is in turn ensured when the contract space is su¢ ciently rich.
I next characterize the AD equilibrium. Given the availability of the asset and cash, in addition
to the AD securities, there are two degrees of freedom in traders￿portfolios, (ai;ci;zi (￿)). Thus,
without loss of generality, suppose all units of the asset are held by optimists, i.e., a0 = 0, and
all units of cash are held by pessimists, i.e., c1 = 0. This convention ensures continuity with
the earlier sections in which optimists invest in the asset and pessimists invest in cash. Under
this convention, optimists ￿nance their asset purchases in part by selling borrowing contracts to
pessimists, and pessimists ￿nance their cash purchases in part by selling borrowing contracts to
optimists. In addition, suppose the following analogues of assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold:
Assumption (A1R). n1 + n0 > E1 [s].
26Assumption (MLRP). The probability distributions F1 and F0 satisfy the monotone likelihood
ratio property: that is,
f1(s)
f0(s) is strictly increasing over S.
The ￿rst assumption ensures that traders￿endowments are su¢ ciently large to purchase the entire
asset supply. The second assumption, which is stronger than both (A2) and (A2S), ensures that
the AD equilibrium takes a simple form. In particular, traders￿AD security positions satisfy:
z1 (s) ￿
(
￿a1s a.e. on fs 2 S j s < ￿ sg
c0 a.e. on fs 2 S j s > ￿ sg
and z0 (s) =
(
a1s a.e. on fs 2 S j s < ￿ sg
￿c0 a.e. on fs 2 S j s > ￿ sg
.
(30)
for some ￿ s 2
￿
smin;smax￿
. That is, optimists sell all of the asset payo⁄ in states s < ￿ s and keep it
in states s > ￿ s. They also buy all of the cash payo⁄ in states s > ￿ s via the AD securities sold by
pessimists. Consequently, optimists receive all of the endowment in the economy in states s > ￿ s,
and they receive nothing in states s < ￿ s. Symmetrically, pessimists receive all of the economy￿ s
endowment in states s < ￿ s. Intuitively, traders of each type concentrate their payo⁄s in the states
in which they ￿nd the most likely.
In addition, AD security prices also take a simple form. To see this, let Ri ￿ 1 denote the
Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of problem (27), which captures type i traders￿gross












R0 , a.e. on fs 2 S j s < ￿ sg
f1(s)








Intuitively, traders of each type price the AD securities in the region in which they receive a















F0 (￿ s) +
1
R1
(1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)). (33)
Finally, market clearing requires optimists￿asset demand to be a1 = 1 and pessimists￿cash demand
to be c0 = n1 + n0 ￿ p. Moreover, since pessimists consume all of the economy￿ s endowment in






(s + (n1 + n0 ￿ p))f0 (s)ds. (34)
The following result completes the characterization and establishes the uniqueness of equilibrium.
Theorem 8 (Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium). Suppose assumptions (A1R) and (MLRP) hold.









1 = 1 and c￿
0 = n1 +
n0 ￿ p (and a￿
0 = c￿
1 = 0). The AD security holdings and prices are respectively given by Eqs.
(30) and (31) for some threshold state, ￿ s￿ 2
￿
smin;smax￿
, and returns R￿
0;R￿
1. The asset price, p,
27along with (￿ s￿;R￿
0;R￿
1) are characterized as the unique solution to the four equations (31) ￿ (34).
The equilibrium asset price satis￿es p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]). The equilibrium is essentially unique
in the sense that p is uniquely determined; and the AD security prices, qAD (s), and traders￿
consumption, ais + ci + zi (s), are uniquely determined a.e. on S.
Theorem 8 illustrates the main results of this section. First, a version of the asymmetric
disciplining result continues to apply with richer contracts. In particular, Eqs. (31) ￿ (34) show
that optimism about the relative likelihood of downside states, s < ￿ s, has no e⁄ect on the asset
price, p, because these states are e⁄ectively priced by pessimists. In contrast, the more detailed
characterization in the appendix, Eqs. (A:27) ￿ (A:28), show that optimism about the relative
likelihood of upside states, s > ￿ s, increases the price.
Second, Eq. (30) illustrates that relatively complex contracts that resemble some of the recent
￿nancial innovations in the US mortgage market endogenously emerge to facilitate betting. In
particular, the asset is tranched so that optimists hold the payo⁄ in states s > ￿ s, while selling
it to pessimists in states s < ￿ s. The tranching of the asset resembles collateralized debt and
mortgage obligations (CDOs and CMOs), which were introduced into the US mortgage market
in the last three decades. The role of these derivatives, just like the role of tranching in the
model, is to split the payo⁄ from the underlying asset across heterogeneous traders. Similarly,
Eq. (30) also illustrates that cash is also tranched so that pessimists hold the payo⁄ in states
s < ￿ s, while optimists hold it in states s > ￿ s. The tranching of cash resembles credit default
swaps (CDSs) or synthetic CDOs which were introduced into the mortgage market in the run-up
to the recent subprime crisis. These insurance arrangements, just like the tranching of the cash in
the model, enable some traders (pessimists in the model) to receive payments in bad states while
paying a premium in good states. Moreover, these contracts arguably played a role in facilitating
speculation in the run-up to the recent crisis by enabling pessimists to take positions in line with
their negative views on the housing market (cf. Lewis, 2010). Taken together, this analysis creates
a presumption that belief disagreements (or a similar source of heterogeneity in valuations) could
be a driving force behind some of the recent ￿nancial innovations in the US mortgage market (see
Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2012, for a similar analysis).
A natural question is how the availability of richer contracts a⁄ects the asset price, p. Ex-
ample 3 in Appendix A.6 shows that the answer is in general ambiguous. In particular, the AD
equilibrium price might be higher or lower than the price in the baseline setting with only simple
debt contracts. Intuitively, richer contracts create two forces that push in opposite directions. On
the one hand, tranching of the asset enables traders to split the asset payo⁄ more ￿e¢ ciently,￿in
the sense that traders receive all of the payo⁄in the states in which they ￿nd the most likely. This
e⁄ect tends to increase the value of the asset (although it also creates other general equilibrium
e⁄ects). On the other hand, tranching of cash similarly enables traders to split the payo⁄ from
cash more e¢ ciently, which tends to increase the value of cash relative to the asset, and thus, to
reduce the asset price. Consequently, the net e⁄ect on the asset price is ambiguous and depends
(among other things) on traders￿endowments, n1 and n0.
287 Conclusion
This paper theoretically analyzed the e⁄ect of belief disagreements on asset prices and ￿nancial
contracts. The central feature of the model is that traders borrow by selling collateralized con-
tracts to lenders who do not share the same beliefs. In particular, the lenders do not value the
collateral as much as the borrowers do, which represents an endogenous borrowing constraint. I
have considered the e⁄ect of this constraint in a number of settings that di⁄er in the types of
collateralized contracts that are available for trade.
In the baseline setting, I have restricted attention to simple debt contracts, which are useful
to analyze optimists￿borrowing constraints. I have also considered an extension with simple short
contracts, which facilitate the analysis of pessimists￿borrowing constraints. These analyses have
established that both optimism and pessimism are asymmetrically disciplined by the endogenous
borrowing constraint. In particular, the tightness of the constraint depends on the nature of belief
disagreements. When belief disagreements are on the upside, optimists are less constrained while
pessimists are more constrained, which leads to relatively low loan margins, relatively high short
margins, and an asset price closer to the optimistic valuation. When belief disagreements are on
the downside, the situation is the opposite.
These results suggest that what investors disagree about matters for asset prices. A large
and growing empirical literature, motivated by Miller￿ s (1977) theoretical ￿ndings, has shown
that accounting for the level of belief disagreements can considerably improve our understanding
of asset prices (e.g., Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001, Yu, 2011, Hong and Sraer, 2012). My paper
suggests that a fruitful future research direction could be to empirically investigate the e⁄ect of
the type of belief disagreements. To give an example of this approach, consider the value e⁄ect in
stock returns. Stocks with high ratios of book value to market value, value stocks, have historically
delivered higher average returns (after controlling their beta with the market portfolio) relative
to stocks with low book-to-market ratios, growth stocks. Various explanations have been o⁄ered
for this phenomenon, which is one of the ￿puzzles￿of the risk-based asset pricing literature. A
prominent non-risk-based explanation is that growth stocks are associated with greater optimism
because some investors extrapolate too much from the recent good performance of these stocks
(cf. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). My paper o⁄ers a related explanation under the
plausible assumption that growth stocks are associated with more upside optimism relative to
value stocks (because they are associated with more uncertainty about upside states). This
di⁄erence in the type of optimism would increase the price of growth stocks, and reduce their
expected returns, even if investors have the same level of optimism for both growth and value
stocks. The key insight is that endogenous borrowing constraints are looser for optimists (and
tighter for pessimists) when optimism is on the upside, which makes the marginal trader in growth
stocks endogenously more optimistic. Consistent with this prediction, Yu (2011) shows that an
increase in belief disagreements about growth stocks (measured by the dispersion of analysts￿
forecasts about long run earnings growth) is associated with a greater price increase compared to
a similar increase in belief disagreements about value stocks.
29My paper also generates testable implications regarding ￿nancial innovation. An extension of
the model with richer contracts has revealed that relatively complex contracts, which resemble
some of the recent ￿nancial innovations (in particular, CDOs, CMOs, and CDSs), endogenously
emerge in equilibrium. These results suggest that belief disagreements (or a similar source of
heterogeneity in valuations) could provide one explanation for the rapid ￿nancial innovation in
the US mortgage market in recent years.
For tractability, the analysis has been carried out with risk neutral traders and two belief
types. The results are robust to allowing for moderate amounts of risk aversion. The main e⁄ect
of risk aversion is to provide an additional disciplining mechanism: Optimists are more reluctant
to make leveraged investments because this increases their portfolio risks. Consequently, they
choose safer debt contracts with higher margins relative to the risk-neutral case.
The results are also robust to allowing for more than two belief types. However, the model
with a greater number of types yields additional insights. In particular, in this case traders are
endogenously divided into three groups such that: the most pessimistic group invests in cash,
the second most pessimistic group lends to optimists, and the optimistic group borrows to make
leveraged investments in the asset. Importantly, when there are more than two continuation states
(and regularity conditions are satis￿ed), borrowers and lenders within the groups are assortatively
matched to one another according to their optimism. More speci￿cally, the borrowers that are
relatively more optimistic borrow from the lenders that are relatively more optimistic. Moreover,
the relatively more optimistic pairs use loans with lower margins. Put di⁄erently, this version of
the model generates the interesting implication that debt contracts with identical collateral but
heterogeneous margins are simultaneously traded in equilibrium. A model along these lines is
analyzed by Fostel and Geanakoplos (2011).
The analysis in this paper has not allowed debt contracts to be used as collateral. This
is without loss of generality for the economy with two belief types considered here, but not
necessarily for economies with more belief types. For example, with three belief types, I conjecture
that the equilibrium will feature a pyramiding arrangement (de￿ned in Geanakoplos, 1997): The
trader with intermediate beliefs will lend to optimists by buying their debt contracts, and it will
borrow from extreme pessimists by using these debt contracts as collateral. This arrangement is
interesting because it captures key features of housing-related credit markets. To give an example,
senior tranches of subprime CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) are debt contracts backed by
subprime mortgage backed securities, which are themselves debt contracts backed by subprime
mortgages, which are themselves debt contracts backed by houses. Understanding the nature of
pyramiding, and its impact on asset prices, is a fascinating topic which I leave for future work.
30A Appendices: Omitted Proofs and Extensions
A.1 Principal-Agent Equilibrium with Simple Debt Contracts
This appendix completes the characterization of the principal-agent equilibrium analyzed in Sec-
tion 3.3. The following lemma establishes some properties which are useful for the characteriza-
tion. The rest of the appendix proves Theorems 2 and 3.
Lemma 1. Suppose optimists￿and pessimists￿beliefs satisfy assumption (A2).
(i) Optimists￿perceived interest rate 1+r
per
1 (￿ s) =
E1[min(s;￿ s)]
E0[min(s;￿ s)] [cf. Eq. (14)] is strictly increasing
in ￿ s over the range
￿
smin;smax￿
. In particular, r
per
1 (￿ s) > 0 for each ￿ s > smin.
(ii) popt (￿ s) is continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly decreasing, i.e.,
dpopt(￿ s)




. Moreover, popt ￿
smin￿
= E1 [s] and popt (smax) = E0 [s].
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i). First note that
dEi[min(s;￿ s)]
d￿ s = 1 ￿ Fi (￿ s) > 0. Using this
expression, the derivative of 1 + r
per
1 (￿ s) =
E1[min(s;￿ s)]






(1 ￿ F1 (￿ s))E0 [min(s; ￿ s)] ￿ E1 [min(s; ￿ s)](1 ￿ F0 (￿ s))
(E0 [min(s; ￿ s)])
2 . (A.1)
Thus, to prove that 1+r
per












E1 [min(s; ￿ s)]
E0 [min(s; ￿ s)]
=
R ￿ s
smin sdF1 + ￿ s(1 ￿ F1 (￿ s))
R ￿ s





1￿F0(s)dF0 + ￿ s(1 ￿ F1 (￿ s))
R ￿ s





1￿F0(￿ s) + ￿ s(1 ￿ F1 (￿ s))
R ￿ s
smin sdF0 + ￿ s(1 ￿ F0 (￿ s))
=
1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F0 (￿ s)
,
where the ￿rst inequality uses the hazard rate inequality (9) and the second inequality uses the
fact that
1￿F1(s)
1￿F0(s) is strictly increasing.
Part (ii). Using Eq. (11), note that
dpopt (￿ s)
d￿ s
￿ ￿ sf0 (￿ s) +
￿
￿f0 (￿ s) + f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F0 (￿ s)





1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
￿
￿
1 ￿ F0 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
￿ sf1 (￿ s)
= ￿(1 ￿ F0 (￿ s))
￿
f0 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F0 (￿ s)
￿
f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
￿
(E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ ￿ s). (A.2)
Here, the ￿rst line applies the chain rule while the second line substitutes E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] and







, in Eq. (A:2) is positive in view of the hazard
rate inequality (9). Since the term, E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ ￿ s, is also positive, it follows that
dpopt(￿ s)
d￿ s < 0.
The second part of the statement follows by considering Eq. (11) for ￿ s = smin and ￿ s = smax.
31Proof of Theorem 2. Most of the proof is provided in Section 3.3. The remaining steps are
to show that RL







p ￿ E0 [min(s; ~ s)]
￿
RL
1 (~ s)(1 ￿ F0 (~ s)) ￿ (1 ￿ F1 (~ s))
￿
. (A.3)





1 ￿ F1 (~ s)
1 ￿ F0 (~ s)
:
Plugging this into (13) and rearranging terms yields p = popt (~ s). Next note by part (iii) of Lemma
1 that there exists exactly one ￿ s 2 S that satis￿es the ￿rst order condition.
It remains to show that the unique critical point corresponds to a maximum. To this end,
consider the value of the derivative,
dRL
1 (~ s)














￿ s=smin > 0. Similarly, note that RL
1 (smax) =
E1[s]￿E1[s]
p￿E0[s] = 0. Using this in






~ s=smax ￿ 0. These boundary conditions imply
that the unique critical point is a maximum of RL
1 (~ s) over S.
Proof of Theorem 3. The analysis in Section 3.3 has characterized the equilibrium as the
intersection of the optimality curve, popt (￿ s), and the weakly increasing market clearing curve,
pmc (￿ s). The remaining step is to verify that there is a unique intersection that satis￿es p 2
(E0 [s];E1 [s]). Note that assumption (A1) implies:
popt ￿
smin￿
= E1 [s] > pmc ￿
smin￿
= n1 + smin.
Note also that:
popt (smax) = E0 [s] < pmc (smax) = n1 + E0 [s].




(iii) of Lemma 1, it follows that the intersection is unique and that p = popt (￿ s) 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]).
A.2 General Equilibrium and the Equivalence Result
This appendix provides the proof for Theorem 1 in Section 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 1. Part (i). See the proof of Theorem 3.
Parts (ii) and (iii). The proof consists of four steps. The ￿rst step notes a number of simplifying
observations which must hold in general equilibrium. The second step states the conditions for
equilibrium in debt markets in terms of traders￿bid and ask prices for debt contracts. The
third step characterizes the existence and the essential uniqueness of equilibrium in debt markets
corresponding to any asset price p 2 [E0 [s];E1 [s]). The fourth step combines this analysis
with asset market clearing to establish the existence and the essential uniqueness of the general
equilibrium, proving part (ii). The analysis in the third and the fourth steps also establish the
equivalence result, proving part (iii).
32Step 1 (Simplifying observations). Suppose, without loss of generality, that the asset price
satis￿es p 2 [E0 [s];E1 [s]).16 First, note that problem (5) is linear. Thus, a trader￿ s value function
take the form vini, where vi denotes her return on net worth. Second, traders always have the







for each i. (A.4)
Third, note that the budget constraints are satis￿ed with equality. Consider the summation of
these constraints, which implies: p + c1 + c0 = n0 + n1. Since p < E1 [s] and n0 + n1 > E1 [s]
[cf. assumption (A1)], the previous equality implies c1 +c0 > 0. That is, some traders must hold
cash in equilibrium. Since cash is not used as collateral, ci > 0 implies the trader￿ s return on net
worth is given by vi = 1. However, the inequalities in (A:4) along with p < E1 [s] imply v1 > 1. It
follows that c1 = 0 and c0 > 0. That is, the traders that hold cash are the pessimists, who have
return v0 = 1. Finally, it can be checked that debt contracts with promise ’ ￿ smax are not used
in equilibrium. Thus, without loss of generality suppose ’ < smax.
Step 2 (Conditions for equilibrium in debt markets). Consider the traders￿bid prices for
debt contracts, given by:
qbid





Similarly de￿ne the trader￿ s ask prices as the price at which trader i would be indi⁄erent to take a
negative position at the debt contract. To sell a debt contract, the trader must hold 1 unit of the
asset as collateral. Thus, the ask price is found by equating the return on a leveraged investment
in the asset with the trader￿ s value per net worth, vi:17








It can be checked that qask
i (’) ￿ qbid





i (’) ￿ q (’) ￿ max
i
qbid (’) for each ’.
In addition, a contract, ’, is traded in positive quantities only if:
qask
i (^ ’) = q (^ ’) = qbid
j (^ ’) for some fi;jg = f0;1g.
I next claim that
qask
0 (’) > qbid
1 (’) for each ’, (A.7)
that is, pessimists￿ask prices are always higher than optimists￿bid prices. Suppose, to reach a
contradiction, that qbid
1 (~ ’) ￿ qask
0 (~ ’) for some ~ ’. Using the de￿nitions in (A:5) and (A:6), this
16The case p ￿ E1 [s] can be ruled out in view of assumption (A1).
17To see this formally, let ￿i denote the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint (4) for the trader￿ s
problem (5). Then, the ask price is the solution to:
viq
ask
i (￿ ’) = E1 [min(s;’)] + ￿i for each i.
The Lagrange multiplier can be solved from the ￿rst order condition for buying a unit of the asset, Ei [s]+￿i = vip.
Plugging this expression into the previous equation gives Eq. (A:6).
33implies:
E1 [min(s; ~ ’)]
p ￿ (E0 [s] ￿ E0 [min(s; ~ ’)])
￿ v1.
After using v1 ￿
E1[s]




E1 [s] ￿ E1 [min(s; ~ ’)]
E0 [s] ￿ E0 [min(s; ~ ’)]
.
Using the second part of Lemma 1,
E1[min(s;~ ’)]




maximum value equal to
E1[s]
E0[s]. Using this observation, it follows that:
E1 [s] ￿ E1 [min(s; ~ ’)]




for each ~ ’ < smax.
Combining the last two equations yields a contradiction since p ￿ E0 [s].
In view of the claim in (A:7), there is no contract with positive trade in which optimists buy
and pessimists sell. Put di⁄erently ^ ￿+
1 = ^ ￿￿
1 = 0, and the equilibrium in debt contracts can be
rewritten as: ￿
q (^ ’) = qbid
0 (^ ’) = qask
1 (^ ’), for each ^ ’ with positive trade,
q (’) 2
￿
maxi qbid (’);mini qask (’)
￿
, for each ’.
(A.8)
Step 3 (Characterizing the essentially unique equilibrium in debt markets). I next
calculate optimists￿value function and borrowing portfolio in equilibrium, v1 and ^ ￿￿
1 . I assume
optimists face quasi-equilibrium debt prices:
~ q (’) = qbid
0 (’) = E0 [min(s;’)]. (A.9)
This is without loss of generality for the purposes of calculating v1 and ^ ￿￿
1 , even though the equi-
librium prices might be di⁄erent than the quasi-equilibrium prices.18 Given the quasi-equilibrium













1 = n1 [budget constraint], R
’2R+ d￿￿
1 ￿ a1. [collateral constraint].









. Since p < E1 [s], the collateral constraint binds. Using the enve-
lope theorem, v1 corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Let ￿1 denote
the Lagrange multiplier for the collateral constraint. The ￿rst order conditions for a1 and ￿￿
1 are
18To see this, note that ~ q (’) ￿ q (’) for each ’. Thus, optimists￿equilibrium problem is di⁄erent than their
quasi-equilibrium problem only if there is a contract ~ ’ such that ~ q (~ ’) = q
bid
0 (~ ’) < q (~ ’). In addition, optimists￿
value function is di⁄erent only if there is positive trade in this contract, which requires q (~ ’) = q
bid
1 (~ ’) = q
ask
0 (~ ’).
This provides a contradiction to the claim in (A:7).
34respectively given by:
E1 [s] + ￿1 = v1p, and






Combining these ￿rst order conditions yields:
RL
1 (’) =
E1 [s] ￿ E1 [min(s;’)]
p ￿ E0 [min(s;’)]






Recall from Appendix A.1 that RL
1 (’) has a unique maximum characterized by p = popt (^ ’). It
follows that there is a unique solution to the ￿rst order condition (A:11), ^ ’. Thus, the optimists￿
borrowing portfolio, ^ ￿￿
1 , is a Dirac measure that puts weight only at one contract ^ ’ 2 R+. In
addition, optimists￿value per net worth is given by v1 = RL
1 (^ ’).
Combining this analysis with the characterization in (A:8), it follows that the equilibria in the
debt markets are characterized by the following conditions:
q (^ ’) = E0 [min(s; ^ ’)], where ^ ’ is the solution to p = popt (^ ’), (A.12)








for each ’ 6= ^ ’.
I next claim that this set is non-empty, that is, there exists an equilibrium in debt markets. In






. In view of (A:12),
these prices constitute an equilibrium if and only if qbid
0 (^ ’) = E0 [min(s; ^ ’)] > qbid
1 (^ ’). This in
turn is the case because qbid
0 (^ ’) = qask
1 (^ ’) > qbid
1 (^ ’).
This analysis also establishes that the equilibrium in debt markets is essentially unique in the
sense that the value per net worth, v1, the traded contract, ^ ’, and the price of the traded contract,
E0 [min(s; ^ ’)], are uniquely determined. However, the price of non-traded debt contracts are not
uniquely determined and their prices can typically take a continuum of values.
Step 4 (Characterizing the essentially unique general equilibrium). Next consider asset
market clearing. Since the collateral constraint in (A:10) binds, optimists sell ^ a1 units of the traded
contract, ^ ’. Plugging this into the budget constraint in (A:10) implies: p^ a1 ￿E0 [min(s; ^ ’)]^ a1 =
n1. Since only optimists demand the asset, market clearing requires ^ a1 = 1. Plugging this into
the previous equation gives the market clearing relation p = pmc (^ ’) [cf. Eq. (16)]. It follows
that a traded contract and price pair, (^ ’; ^ p), corresponds to a general equilibrium if and only if
it solves ^ p = popt (^ ’) = pmc (^ ’). In view of Theorem 3, there is a unique pair, (^ ’; ^ p), that solves
these equations. It follows that there exists an essentially unique general equilibrium which is
equivalent to the principal agent equilibrium.
A.3 Comparative Statics with Simple Debt Contracts
This appendix provides proofs for the theorems in Section 4.




= 0 since ~ E1 [s] = E1 [s], and also that g (smax) = 0. I claim that:




35The comparative statics for p and ￿ s￿ then follow by the argument provided after Theorem 4. For
the comparative statics of the margin, substitute Eq. (16) into (17) to get m = n1=p. It follows
that the margin decreases because p increases and n1 is unchanged. If ~ F1 satis￿es condition (18)
strictly, then the inequality in (A:13) holds strictly and the comparative statics for p; ￿ s￿ and m
also become strict.
The remaining step is the proof of claim (A:13). I start by calculating g0 (￿ s). Consider ￿rst
the derivative of the conditional valuation:
d ~ E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s]
d￿ s
=
~ f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ ~ F1 (￿ s)
￿
~ E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ ￿ s
￿
.
This expression further implies:
g0 (￿ s) =
~ f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ ~ F1 (￿ s)
￿




1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
(E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ ￿ s)
=
 
~ f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ ~ F1 (￿ s)
￿
f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
!￿




1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
g (￿ s). (A.14)






1￿ ~ F1(￿ s) ￿
f1(￿ s)
1￿F1(￿ s) for s < sR. Thus, Eq. (A:14) constitutes a di⁄erential




= 0. It follows that g (￿ s) ￿ 0 for each ￿ s 2
￿
smin;sR￿
, proving the claim over
this range.





1￿ ~ F1(￿ s) ￿
f1(￿ s)
1￿F1(￿ s)
for s > sR. Note also that ~ E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ ￿ s ￿ 0. Using these inequalities, Eq. (A:14) implies:
g0 (￿ s) ￿
~ f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ ~ F1 (￿ s)
g (￿ s) for each ￿ s 2 [sR;smax). (A.15)
Next suppose, to reach a contradiction, that there exists ^ s < smax such that g (^ s) < 0. De￿ne
^ smax = supfs 2 [^ s;smax) j g (s) ￿ g (^ s)g. Note that g (^ smax) = g (^ s) < 0 by the continuity of g (￿).
Note also that ^ smax < smax since g (smax) = 0. Then, the inequality in (A:15) applies for ^ smax and
implies g0 (^ smax) ￿
~ f1(^ s)
1￿ ~ F1(^ s)g (^ smax) < 0. This further implies that there exists s 2 (^ smax;smax)
such that g (s) < g (^ smax) = g (^ s), which contradicts the de￿nition of ^ smax. It follows that g (￿ s) ￿ 0
for each ￿ s 2
￿
sR;smax￿
, proving the claim also over this range.
I next consider the proof of Theorem 5. The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider two probability distributions F1 and F0 that satisfy assumption (A2).
(i) Suppose optimists become weakly more optimistic, i.e., consider their beliefs are changed




￿ s ; ~ F1
￿
￿ popt (￿ s ; F1) for each ￿ s 2 S:
The market clearing curve is unchanged.
(ii) Suppose pessimists become weakly more pessimistic, i.e., consider their beliefs are changed




￿ s ; ~ F0
￿
￿ popt (￿ s ; F0) for each ￿ s 2 S. (A.16)
Moreover, the market clearing curve also shifts down, that is:
pmc
￿
￿ s ; ~ F0
￿
￿ pmc (￿ s ; F0) for each ￿ s 2 S. (A.17)
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (i). In view of Eq. (12), it su¢ ces to show that
~ E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] for each ￿ s 2 S:
Note that
~ f1(￿ s)
1￿ ~ F1(￿ s) ￿
f1(￿ s)
1￿F1(￿ s) for each ￿ s 2 S. Thus, the previous displayed inequality follows from
the argument in (the second step of) the proof of Theorem 4.
Part (ii). To show (A:16), de￿ne the function h : S ! R with
h(￿ s) = popt (￿ s ; F0) ￿ popt
￿
￿ s ; ~ F0
￿
.
Note that (A:16) is equivalent to showing that h(￿ s) ￿ 0for each ￿ s 2 S. I will prove the stronger




To prove that h(￿ s) is weakly increasing, consider the derivative of h(￿ s). After using Eq. (A:2)









F0 (￿ s) ￿ ~ F0 (￿ s)
￿
!
(E1 [s j s ￿ ￿ s] ￿ ￿ s). (A.18)
Next note that
~ f0(￿ s)
1￿ ~ F0(￿ s) ￿
f0(￿ s)
1￿F0(￿ s), which also implies
~ f0(￿ s)￿f0(￿ s)
F0(￿ s)￿ ~ F0(￿ s) ￿
f0(￿ s)






~ f0 (￿ s) ￿ f0 (￿ s)
F0 (￿ s) ￿ ~ F0 (￿ s)
￿
f1 (￿ s)
1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)
.
Using this inequality in Eq. (A:18) shows that
dh(￿ s)
d￿ s ￿ 0, which completes the proof of (A:16).
To show (A:17), recall from Lemma 1 that
E1[min(s;￿ s)]
E0[min(s;￿ s)] is increasing in ￿ s. Taking F0 in place of
F1 and ~ F0 in place of F0, this implies
E0[min(s;￿ s)]
~ E0[min(s;￿ s)] is increasing in ￿ s. This in turn implies:
E0 [min(s; ￿ s)] ￿ ~ E0 [min(s; ￿ s)] for each ￿ s 2 S:
Using this inequality in Eq. (16) proves (A:17).




implies F0 and F1 are unchanged over this range. From Eq. (16), it follows that
pmc (￿ s) is also unchanged over this range. On the other hand, I claim that popt (￿ s) shifts up over
this range. Since popt (￿) is decreasing and pmc (￿) is increasing, this claim implies that the new
intersection point is for a greater ￿ s￿ and a greater p. It follows that p and ￿ s￿ increase. This also
implies that the margin m = n1=p decreases.




end, ￿rst note that part (i) of Lemma 2 implies:
popt
￿
￿ s ; F0; ~ F1
￿
￿ popt (￿ s ; F0;F1) for each ￿ s 2 S. (A.19)




. By Eq. (11), this implies:
popt
￿




￿ s ; F0; ~ F1
￿




That is, the change in F0 [which is concentrated on the region (￿ s￿;smax)] does not a⁄ect the
optimality curve over the region
￿
smin; ￿ s￿￿
. Combining Eq. (A:20) with the inequality in (A:19)




Part (ii). Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2 imply that pmc (￿ s) shifts down over the entire range
S. I also claim that popt (￿ s) shifts down over the range (￿ s￿;smax). Since popt (￿) is decreasing and
pmc (￿) is increasing, this claim implies that the new intersection point is for a lower price p. It
also follows that the margin m = n1=p increases.
Thus, it remains to prove the claim that popt (￿ s) shifts down over the range (￿ s￿;smax). To this
end, ￿rst note that part (ii) of Lemma 2 implies:
popt
￿
￿ s ; ~ F0;F1
￿
￿ popt (￿ s ; F0;F1) for each ￿ s 2 S. (A.21)
That is, ignoring the change in F1, the optimality curve shifts down. Next recall that by assump-
tion
f0
1￿F0 is unchanged over (￿ s￿;smax). By Eq. (11), this implies:
popt
￿




￿ s ; ~ F0;F1
￿
for each ￿ s 2 (￿ s￿;smax). (A.22)
That is, the change in F1 [which is concentrated on the region
￿
smin; ￿ s￿￿
] does not a⁄ect the
optimality curve over the region (￿ s￿;smax). Combining Eq. (A:22) with the inequality in (A:21)
proves that popt (￿ s) shifts down for ￿ s 2 (￿ s￿;smax).
A.4 Equilibrium with Short Contracts
This appendix completes the characterization of the equilibrium analyzed in Section 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 6. I ￿rst show that there is unique solution to p = popt;S (￿). With some









1 ￿ F1 (￿) + F0 (￿)
R ￿




f1 (￿) R ￿
smin sdF1
￿
f0 (￿) R ￿
smin sdF0
#"




It can be checked that the last bracketed term is positive. The second to last bracketed term is also
positive in view of assumption (A2S). This implies
dpopt;S(￿)
d￿ < 0. Note also that popt;S ￿
smin￿
=
E1 [s] and popt;S (smax) = E0 [s]. Since p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]), it follows that there is a unique solution




I next show that the unique solution to p = popt;S (￿) corresponds to the solution to problem










This expression is the expected return of pessimists who sell one unit of short contract with cash
collateral ￿. The derivative of RS























Setting this expression to zero and rearranging terms implies the ￿rst order condition p =
popt;S (￿). Since there is a unique solution to p = popt;S (￿), it follows that there is a unique
maximum RS
1 (￿) characterized by the ￿rst order condition.
Asset market clearing and characterization of equilibrium. Eq. (22) implies mS =
￿￿q(￿)
























there is a unique solution to this equation denoted by pmc;S (￿). Moreover, pmc;S (￿) is increasing
because the right hand side is strictly decreasing in ￿. It can also be checked that pmc;S ￿
smin￿
<
E1 [s] and that pmc;S (smax) > E0 [s] [in view of assumption (A1S)]. Consequently, popt;S (￿)
and pmc;S (￿) intersect at some ￿ 2
￿
smin;smax￿
and p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s]). This completes the
characterization of equilibrium.
A.5 Equilibrium with Simple Short and Debt Contracts
Sections 3 and 5 considered the equilibrium with either simple debt contracts or simple short
contracts in isolation. This appendix presents a model that features both types of contracts, and
shows that the asymmetric disciplining result continues to apply in this setting.
Consider a variant of the general equilibrium de￿ned in Section 2 with the contract space
BT = BD [ BS, where BD and BS are respectively the set of simple debt and short contracts
de￿ned in Eqs. (7) and (21). To keep the analysis tractable, I also assume that only a fraction
￿S 2 [0;1] of traders can sell short contracts, while only a fraction ￿D 2 [0;1] can sell debt
contracts. That is, only a fraction of traders can short sell the asset or leverage their investments
in the asset. These assumptions are not unreasonable because short selling in ￿nancial markets




are such that the equilibrium price is interior, p 2 (E0 [s];E1 [s])
[which will be veri￿ed after the characterization].
39Under these assumptions, there exists an equilibrium of the following form. The fraction, ￿D,
of optimists leverage their investments in the asset using a loan with riskiness ￿ s 2 S. The debt
contracts they sell are bought by the fraction, 1 ￿ ￿S, of pessimists who are unable to short sell.
On the other hand, the fraction, ￿S, of pessimists short sell the asset using cash collateral ￿ 2 S.
The short contracts they sell are bought by the fraction, 1 ￿ ￿D, of optimists who are unable
to leverage. To see the intuition for this matching, note that pessimists that are able to short
sell require a greater interest rate to part with their endowment than those who are unable to
short sell. This is because they have a greater expected rate of return on their endowment (in
view of their ability to short sell). Consequently, optimists borrow cash from the latter type of
pessimists. A similar reasoning shows that pessimists borrow the asset from optimists who are
unable to leverage.
An equilibrium can then be represented by a triple, (p; ￿ s;￿). Moreover, the optimal debt and
short contracts are characterized by the same analysis in Sections 3 and 5. In particular, the
riskiness of the optimal loan, ￿ s, is characterized as the solution to p = popt (￿ s) [cf. Eq. (11)].
Similarly, the cash-collateral of the optimal short contract is characterized as the solution to
p = pmc (￿ s). Assume that beliefs satisfy assumption (MLRP) of Section 6, which ensures that the
optimal debt and short contracts are uniquely determined. The remaining step is asset market






+ 1 ￿ ￿D
￿









Here, m(￿ s;p) denotes the loan margin [cf. Eq. (17)] and mS (￿;p) denotes the short margin [cf.
Eq. (A:23)]. The left hand side of Eq. (A:25) is the total demand for the asset which consists of
demand by the fraction, ￿D, of optimists who leverage their investments and the fraction, 1￿￿D,
of optimists who are unable to leverage. The right hand side is the total supply of the asset
which consists of the physical supply of 1 unit and the short contracts sold by the fraction, ￿S,
of pessimists who are able to short sell.
Eq. (A:25) de￿nes a third (market clearing) equation between the asset price p and the
contracts (￿ s;￿). The equilibrium triple, (p; ￿ s;￿), is characterized by the solution to this equation
along with the optimality conditions p = popt (￿ s) = popt;S (￿). To illustrate the asymmetric
disciplining result, suppose the belief disagreements shift to upside states (while keeping E1 [s]
and E0 [s] constant). By the analysis in Section 4, this induces optimists to leverage using loans
with a smaller riskiness, ￿ s, and a lower loan margin, m. By the analysis in Section 5, this also
induces pessimists to short sell using a larger cash-collateral, ￿, and a higher short margin, mS. In
view of these observations, the market clearing relation (A:25) implies that (keeping p constant)
the demand for the asset increases while the e⁄ective supply of the asset decreases. This in turn
leads to a higher equilibrium price. Conversely, if the belief disagreements shift to downside states,
then the loan margin increases, the short margin decreases, and the asset price decreases.
A.6 Equilibrium with Richer Contracts
This appendix presents the proofs of the results in Section 6. It also presents an example to
illustrate that richer contracts have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the asset price.















i for each s 2 S, (A.26)
40as the corresponding AD positions for type i traders. Given the prices in (29), the budget
constraint (3) can be written as aip￿ + ci +
R
S zi (s)qAD (s)ds ￿ ni. Note also that the collateral
constraint implies that ais + ci ￿ zi (s) ￿ 0 a.e. s. Hence, a portfolio is feasible in problem (5)
only if the corresponding portfolio, (ai;ci;zi), is feasible in problem (27). In addition, note also
that the objective values of the two problems are identical because Eq. (A:26) implies:
aiEi [s] + ci + Ei
￿R










(ais + ci + zi (s))dFi.
Next note that the constructed portfolios,
￿
^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+
i ; ^ ￿￿
i
￿
, are feasible for traders given the
constructed prices, (^ p;[^ q (￿)]) (since the contract space is su¢ ciently rich). Moreover, the portfolio, ￿
^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+
i ; ^ ￿￿
i
￿
, yields type i traders the same utility as the AD portfolio, (a￿
i;c￿
i;z￿
i ). I next claim
that the portfolio,
￿
^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+
i ; ^ ￿￿
i
￿
, is also optimal for these traders, i.e., it solves problem (5)
with prices (^ p;[^ q (￿)]). Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that there is an alternative portfolio, ￿
~ ai;~ ci; ~ ￿+
i ; ~ ￿￿
i
￿
, that results in a strictly higher value. Construct the e⁄ective AD positions, ~ zi (s),
as above. Note that the alternative AD portfolio, (~ ai;~ ci; ~ zi), is feasible for problem (5). It also
results in a strictly higher value for type i traders than the portfolio, (a￿
i;c￿
i;z￿




i ) is not optimal for problem (5), which yields a contradiction. It follows that the
constructed portfolios and prices,
￿￿
^ ai;^ ci; ^ ￿+
i ; ^ ￿￿
i
￿
;(^ p;[^ q (￿)])
￿
, constitute a general equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 8. First consider prices and traders￿positions in AD securities. Assumption
(A1R) ensures that, in equilibrium, both the asset and cash are held in positive quantities. Thus,




















i (s)qAD (s)ds = n1 and znet
i (s) ￿ 0 a.e. on S,
where znet
i (s) = ais + ci + zi (s) denotes consumption in state s. Let Ri denote the Lagrange















, a.e. on S.







a.e. on S. In view of
assumption (MLRP), this implies that the AD security prices are given by Eq. (31) and traders￿
positions in these securities are given by Eq. (30).







f1(￿ s). Using this expression, Eq. (33) characterizes pessimists￿rate of return:
41R0 (￿ s) = F0 (￿ s) +
f0 (￿ s)
f1 (￿ s)
(1 ￿ F1 (￿ s)).





f1(smin) and R0 (smax) = 1. Using these expressions, Eq. (32) can be written as:
p = popt;AD (￿ s) ￿
R ￿ s




￿ s sf1 (s)ds
F0 (￿ s) +
f0(￿ s)
f1(￿ s) (1 ￿ F1 (￿ s))
. (A.27)
It can be checked that popt;AD (￿ s) is a strictly decreasing function with popt;AD ￿
smin￿
= E1 [s] and
popt;AD (smax) = E0 [s].
Note also that the market clearing condition (34) can be rearranged as:














In addition, the function pmc;AD (￿) is strictly increasing with lim￿ s!smin pmc;AD (￿ s) = ￿1 and
pmc;AD (smax) = n1 + E0 [s]. It follows that there exists a unique (p; ￿ s￿) characterized as the




. Given ￿ s￿, traders￿returns are given by R￿














. In view of the above analysis, this solution corresponds to the
essentially unique AD equilibrium, completing the proof.
Example 3 (E⁄ect of Richer Contracts on the Asset Price). Consider the state space
S =[0;1]. Suppose pessimists and optimists have the prior belief distributions F0 and F1 with
density functions:
f0 (s) = 1 for each s 2 S, f1 (s) =
￿
7=8, if s 2 [0;3=4)
11=8, if s 2 [3=4;1]
,
which satisfy assumption (MLRP) with weak inequalities. Let pdebt denote the equilibrium price
with simple debt contracts (characterized in Theorem 3) and pAD denote the AD equilibrium price
(characterized in Theorem 8). Suppose optimists￿endowment is given by n1 = 0:4, and consider
two cases that di⁄er in pessimists￿endowment.
Case (i). Suppose pessimists have a relatively small endowment, i.e., n0 = 0:2. Then,
pdebt = 0:537 and pAD = 0:547 = E1 [s]. In particular, the asset price in the AD equilibrium is
higher.
Case (ii). Suppose pessimists have a larger endowment, i.e., n0 = 1. Then, pdebt = 0:537
and pAD = 0:5 = E0 [s]. In particular, the asset price in the AD equilibrium is lower.
Hence, richer contracts have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the asset price.
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